

ANNUAL REPORT
ON ANTISEMITISM
IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
FOR 2024



FEDERATION
OF JEWISH
COMMUNITIES,
CZECH REPUBLIC

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Have you become a victim or a witness to an antisemitic incident?

Don't keep it to yourself; write to us.

Contact email: antisemitismus@fzo.cz.

Antisemitic Incident Report Form: nahlasincident.cz.

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
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1 | SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS

The Federation of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as FJC) recorded a total of 4,694 antisemitic incidents in 2024. This represents an 8.46% increase over the 2023 total of 4,328 incidents. In the long term, the data for the past year represent a historical maximum; however, the trend of sharp increases evident in previous years has stopped. For predicting future developments, this finding could seemingly be a reason for cautious optimism. However, an analysis of the statistical data shows that the severity of antisemitic incidents increased dramatically following the events of October 7, 2023.

The collected data does not provide a comprehensive statistical overview of all antisemitic incidents in 2024. The FJC draws its information exclusively from open sources, thereby representing only a small segment of the described reality. The number of recorded incidents also depends on the willingness and ability of victims and witnesses to report antisemitic incidents. In the Czech Republic, as in other countries, hate crimes continue to be underreported, often due to stigmatisation, mistrust of institutions or concerns about personal safety. The FJC statistics cannot answer the question of what proportion of the Czech population thinks or acts antisemitic. Still, they do tell us about trends and the social climate concerning anti-Jewish hatred.



In the Czech Republic, antisemitic violence occurs only rarely. Between 2020 and 2023, two violent attacks were reported to the FJC (in 2020 and 2021). Last year set a historical record in this regard, with four cases of physical assault being recorded. All of them occurred in the context of the Middle East conflict.

At the end of January 2024, there was an attempted arson attack on the Agudas Achim synagogue in Brno. The improvised explosive device failed to detonate, but the police classified the incident as an attempted terrorist act. In the following months, a covert international investigation led to the arrest of five individuals aged 13 to 18. Some of those arrested were active not only in the Czech Republic but also in Slovakia, Austria, and the United Kingdom. Two suspects were charged with supporting and promoting ter-

rorism, inciting hatred, and attempting a terrorist attack. One of the suspects was also recruiting people to participate in fighting in Syria. Cold weapons, gas pistols, military equipment, and items with extremist symbolism were seized during house searches. The detainees were radicalised online via social networks and an online communication platform. The content the suspects engaged with included support for the so-called Islamic State, endorsement of Islamist attacks, promotion of jihadism, and the spread of hatred against the LGBT+ community, Jews, and other minorities. In the Czech context, this is a landmark case where online antisemitism escalated into an attempted violent attack on a Jewish target.

Nevertheless, we can still say that the Czech Republic, in comparison to other countries and regions, remained a safe country for the Jewish community in 2024.

However, the Czech Republic was also hit by the global explosive wave of antisemitism that erupted immediately after the Hamas terrorist attack of October 7, 2023. The subsequent war in Gaza had a fundamental impact on both the number and the content of antisemitic manifestations in 2024 and significantly contributed to the polarisation of Czech society. Data from previous years shows that any escalation of violence within the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has always led to a sharp increase in antisemitism. The current situation, however, is different. While previous crises were short and time-limited, the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas is unprecedented in its duration. Events in the Middle East remain at the centre of attention worldwide and among the Czech public. The normalisation of antisemitism, which emerged as a distinct trend in late 2023, was consolidated and completed over the course of 2024. Anti-Jewish hatred, particularly in the form of the demonisation and delegitimisation of the State of Israel,

became a socially acceptable attitude and dominated public discourse. From an ideological perspective, an unprecedented synergy occurred between the far-right, the far-left, Islamism, and the disinformation scene. The unifying element is hatred for Israel, which uses the motifs, narratives, conspiracies, and myths of traditional antisemitism.

- In 2024, 12 cases of vandalism against Jewish properties, sacred buildings, cemeteries, and monuments were recorded. This is the highest number in history and double the number compared to 2023, when the FJC recorded six incidents of this kind.
- In 2024, 118 targeted incidents aimed at a specific person, property, or institution were recorded. This figure represents a historical maximum. It is a 64% increase from the 72 incidents recorded the previous year. The number of targeted incidents began to rise sharply after the events of October 7th.
- Regarding the content of antisemitic incidents, the general category of false, dehumanising, demonising, vulgar, or stereotypical statements and conspiracy theories has always been dominant. The second most numerous category was manifestations of new antisemitism. The year 2024 represents a turning point in this context, as for the first time in the history of long-term monitoring of anti-Jewish hatred in the Czech Republic, new antisemitism prevailed. At the same time, the number of incidents linked to traditional stereotypes and conspiracies decreased year-on-year by more than 23%. The sharp increase in new antisemitism began immediately after the events of October 7th. In 2024, the FJC recorded 2,235 incidents, representing almost 48% of the total. Compared to 2023, when 1,242 incidents were recorded, representing an 80% increase.

- In 2024, the FJC recorded 122 cases of Holocaust denial and distortion. This figure represents a historical maximum compared to 2023, when 83 incidents were recorded, representing a 47% increase.
- The virtual environment has long played an unequivocally key role in the spread of antisemitism. In 2024, 4,503 incidents originated from the online space, accounting for 95.93% of the total. In 2023, this figure was 98.01%, and in 2022, it was 97.1%. Social media remains the dominant platform for spreading antisemitism online, with the FJC recording 3,364 incidents on them last year.
- A statistically significant trend is associated with manifestations of antisemitism in public spaces. The number of these incidents reached a historical peak in 2024. The FJC recorded 162 cases, a 184% increase compared to 2023, when 57 cases were recorded. The largest proportion consisted of antisemitic expressions at public gatherings, demonstrations, protests, debates, lectures, cultural events, etc. These included shouted slogans and chants, banners, and statements by speakers. While the FJC historically recorded only a few isolated incidents, the period after October 7th marked a radical shift. This culminated in a historic peak in 2024, with antisemitism documented at 73 pro-Palestinian events—nearly triple the number from the previous year. The second largest group of incidents in public spaces consists of various forms of vandalism. The FJC recorded 61 cases, more than five times the 12 incidents recorded in 2023.
- In terms of the ideological background or motivation for antisemitism, incidents on disinformation platforms constituted the most numerous category. The FJC recorded 1,516 incidents, representing 32.3% of the

total. Both these figures are comparable to 2023, when 1,422 incidents, representing 32.86%, were recorded. Until the beginning of 2019, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim narratives prevailed in disinformation conspiracies. In 2020-2021, the main topic became the COVID-19 pandemic. Soon after the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukrainian territory, the disinformation ecosystem pivoted to open pro-Kremlin propaganda. Following the events of October 7th, disinformation platforms began massively spreading lies and manipulation directed against the State of Israel. In terms of content, anti-Jewish conspiracy theories and manifestations of new antisemitism predominated in these incidents.

- Antisemitic manifestations associated with the far-right were the second most numerous category, with 993 incidents recorded by the FJC in 2024 – a 12% increase from the 885 incidents in 2023. Although far-right antisemitism has increased in absolute numbers annually and dominated the statistics in 2021 and 2022, its share of the total number of incidents has decreased significantly over the last three years. While in 2021, the far-right was responsible for nearly 47% of the spread of anti-Jewish hatred, this figure fell to around 21% in 2023 and 2024. In 2024, far-right antisemitic expressions were most often based on classic stereotypes and conspiracy myths about Jews as a hidden elite controlling media, finance, and politics. In relation to the war between Israel and Hamas, the right-wing scene also adopted the Islamist and leftist narrative of new antisemitism.
- The number of incidents originating from the far-right is comparable to the number of incidents for which a specific ideological motivation cannot be determined. The FJC recorded 933 such incidents, representing 19.88% of the total. This is a 34% decrease from 2023, when 1,413 in-

cidents were recorded. Until 2023, cases without an identified ideology always constituted roughly one-third of all antisemitic manifestations. In 2024, their share fell below 20% for the first time, while the number of incidents involving perpetrators aligned with one of the extremist ideological streams rose significantly. This inverse relationship can be explained by the progressing polarisation and radicalisation of society.

- Antisemitic manifestations associated with the far-left were historically a completely marginal phenomenon. While their number increased slightly year-on-year, it remained in double digits. The situation changed radically immediately after the terrorist attack of October 7, 2023. The number of antisemitic incidents originating from the far-left began to grow unprecedentedly. In 2023, the FJC recorded 287 incidents, an increase of 226% from 2022. In 2024, this trend reached a historical peak. A total of 886 incidents were recorded, representing 18.88% of the total and a year-on-year increase of 209%. The ideological content of these hateful manifestations was almost exclusively that of new antisemitism.
- The narratives of new antisemitism are behind the dramatic increase in the number of incidents stemming from Islamism. Following the events of October 7, 2023, Islamism was the fastest-growing ideological motivation for anti-Jewish hatred. In 2024, the FJC recorded 296 incidents, representing 6.31% of the total and a year-on-year increase of 40%

2 | INTRODUCTION

2.1 | THE AIM OF THE ANNUAL REPORT ON ANTISEMITISM

Annual reports on antisemitism in the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as AR) are prepared by the Federation of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic (FJC) for the internal needs of Jewish communities in the Czech Republic and other domestic and foreign institutions that process data on antisemitism. The goal of the report is to provide, within the scope of the information obtained, a comprehensive picture of antisemitism, trends and the social climate concerning anti-Jewish hatred.

Antisemitism poses a danger not only for the Jewish community but also for the whole of Czech society, as it significantly contributes to its polarisation. The availability of relevant data is a basic condition for effectively preventing socially pathological phenomena. The FJC is aware of its social responsibility and submits its annual report to state institutions responsible for combating bias-motivated hatred.

2.2 | METHODOLOGY OF MONITORING ANTISEMITISM

DEFINITION OF ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS

The FJC classifies an antisemitic incident as any intentional act or expression

with demonstrably antisemitic motivation or content as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA; see chapter 2.3). Antisemitic incidents take place in physical and online spaces and can take various forms, i.e., physical or verbal attacks, vandalism of property, threats, harassing behaviour, discrimination, hate mail, posts on social media, offensive flyers or posters, etc. Anti-Jewish hatred can be directed against Jews or persons who are considered to be Jews or against institutions and property that are actually or supposedly connected to the Jewish community.

At least two qualified analysts assess each incident. In cases where there is doubt about whether an incident can be classified as antisemitic, further experts are consulted. If it is not possible to reach a unanimous agreement, the incident is not included in the database. Likewise, all incidents that could not be fully verified are excluded from the database.

DATA SOURCES AND RELEVANCE

The FJC collects data from victims and witnesses of antisemitic incidents, Czech Jewish organisations and communities, the general public, the Police of the Czech Republic and open sources, which include renowned news servers, disinformation platforms, the press, websites, social media, etc.

The FJC provides an online form for reporting antisemitic incidents at www.nahlasincident.cz. A link is placed in the form of a banner on the websites of many Czech Jewish institutions. Individuals and organisations also contact the FJC in person, by phone or in writing. The number of reported incidents is increasing year-on-year, but it still accounts for a statistically marginal share of the collected data. At the same time, whistleblowers usually report incidents involving more serious crimes or content.

Data collection has many operational and logistical limitations. Regarding the methodology of specific forms of monitoring, we think it is necessary to highlight the following:

- The number of antisemitic incidents recorded through the communication channels of the FJC depends on, among other things, the willingness and ability of victims and witnesses to report antisemitic incidents. Several Jewish and European institutions¹ have long drawn attention to the insufficient reporting of antisemitic incidents, often due to stigmatisation, mistrust of institutions or concerns about personal safety. Therefore, the statistical overview presented in the AR does not reflect the full number of incidents that occurred in the last year.
- There are currently dozens of social media and communication platforms that allow their users to engage in more or less hidden activity. Aware of this fact, the FJC has long been actively monitoring the profiles of selected individuals and groups on the social networks Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, VKontakte, Gloria.tv, Gab and X (formerly Twitter). Antisemitic incidents from other platforms are included in the database only if they have been reported to the FJC. Monitoring is focused exclusively on contributions by authors who publish without limiting the sharing or visibility of their posts. The collected data thus represents only a fraction of

¹ E.g.: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. *Jewish People's Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism*. Online. 2024, pp. 20–21, 82–87. Available from: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-experiences-perceptions-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

Council of the European Commission. *Council Declaration on fostering Jewish life and combating antisemitism - Council Declaration (15 October 2024)*. Online. 2024. Available from: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14245-2024-INIT/en/pdf>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

European Commission. *Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council. No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred*. Online. 2023. Available from: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52023JC0051>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

the actual number of antisemitic incidents in the social media environment.

- Each antisemitic post on social media is included in the database as one incident, regardless of the number of shares.
- Antisemitic posts appear in online media below articles reporting on Jews, Israel and the Middle East, as well as in articles that are not thematically related to the Jewish community. The number of hate comments increases gradually, often several months after the publication of a particular article. Monitoring is conducted manually without the use of specialised software or AI. Therefore, the FJC monitors discussion posts below thematically relevant articles for only 7 days after publication. Regardless of the number of antisemitic comments under a single article, the entire discussion is counted as a single incident in the database.
- At demonstrations, public meetings, lectures, debates, cultural and social events, several antisemitic incidents often appear simultaneously, e.g. speakers' statements, banners, and chants, etc. Regardless of the number of these incidents, each public event is counted as a single incident in the database.

The FJC draws information on antisemitism exclusively from open sources. Given the above monitoring limits, it is important to emphasise that the data collected in this report do not constitute a complete statistical overview. The AR captures only a small segment of the described reality and cannot answer the question of what proportion of the Czech population thinks or acts antisemitic. However, the FJC methodology has been consistent and unchanging for a long time, thus making it possible to identify and name trends in anti-Jewish hatred. Based on year-on-year comparisons, quantitative data sets allow relevant qualitative observations.

ANONYMISATION OF DATA

The AR contains only a general representation of antisemitic incidents and texts that the FJC recorded in 2024. In the illustrative examples published in the AR, the authors' names and profile photos have been removed or intentionally made illegible to comply with data protection requirements. Similarly, with the safety of victims and witnesses in mind, details enabling identification are excluded in cases of targeted incidents. Only in the case of personally targeted attacks published by those who have become the target of such an attack does the AR retain the identification data in full. Online incidents in visual form are reprinted as images in the AR. Online incidents in the form have been transcribed from screenshots for clarity and readability, including typos and stylistic and grammatical errors.

2.3 | WORKING DEFINITION OF ANTISEMITISM

When compiling this report, we have been guided by the working definition of antisemitism issued by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).² The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic adopted a resolution agreeing to the IHRA definition on 25 January 2019.³ The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic also adopted the resolution on 30 January 2019.⁴

² International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. *Working definition of antisemitism*. Online. 2016. Available from: <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

³ The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. *Den památky obětí holokaustu*. Online. 2019. Available from: <https://www.psp.cz/sqw/cms.sqw?z=12305>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁴ The Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. *81. usnesení Senátu z 5. schůze, konané dne 30. ledna 2019*. Online. 2019. Available from: <https://www.senat.cz/xqw/webdav/pssenat/original/90463/75783>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

Among other things, the working definition of antisemitism aims to provide practical guidance on identifying incidents and data collection. It also contains specific illustrative examples of antisemitism.

“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.

To guide IHRA in its work, the following examples may serve as illustrations:

Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel, similar to that levelled against any other country, cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for ‘why things go wrong’. It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, considering the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
- Making mendacious, dehumanising, demonising, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as a collective, such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy

or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.

- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.
- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.
- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour.
- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behaviour not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterise Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for the actions of the state of Israel.

Antisemitic acts are criminal when they are so defined by law (for example, denial of the Holocaust or distribution of antisemitic materials in some countries).

Criminal acts are antisemitic when the targets of attacks, whether they are people or property – such as buildings, schools, places of worship and

cemeteries – are selected because they are, or are perceived to be, Jewish or linked to Jews.

Antisemitic discrimination is the denial to Jews of opportunities or services available to others and is illegal in many countries.”⁵

2.4 | THE ‘NEW ANTISEMITISM’, ‘3D’ TEST AND BDS

The AR also uses the term new antisemitism.⁶ This term is not codified in the Czech legal system. From a methodological point of view, however, it is a useful tool, as it captures the essence of illegitimate criticism of the State of Israel as defined by the above working definition of antisemitism. The concept of ‘New Anti-Semitism’ refers to the so-called ‘3D’ test, the author of which is Natan Sharansky.⁷ According to this test, an incident that contains at least one of the so-called ‘3Ds’ is considered antisemitic.

The first ‘D’ represents the ‘Demonisation’ of Israel, i.e. the identification of Israel with evil, aggression, the source of world crises, etc. An example can be comparing the policy of the State of Israel to Nazi Germany or the Palestinian refugee camps to concentration camps, etc.

⁵ The Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. *Usnesení PS č. 463 k návrhu usnesení Poslanecké sněmovny ke Dni památky obětí holocaustu a předcházení zločinům proti lidskosti/sněmovní dokument 2076/ (25. ledna 2019)*. Online. 2019. Available from: <https://www.psp.cz/sqw/text/text2.sqw?idd=154253&fbclid=IwAR31Kha856GxR-Cyg0de4grIWVKIJAY8-tj01esQXoI4XJ73wnCa7DrPPD5o>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁶ The term “Israel-related antisemitism” is also used.

⁷ Sharansky, Natan. *3D Test of Anti-Semitism: Demonization, Double Standards, Delegitimization*. In *Jewish Political Studies Review* 16: 3-4, Fall 2004. Online. 2004. Available from: <https://jcpa.org/article/3d-test-of-anti-semitism-demonization-double-standards-delegitimization/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

The second 'D' stands for 'Double Standards', which are selectively applied to the State of Israel when assessing its foreign policy or internal affairs. Israel is the target of many unilateral condemning statements and resolutions, especially by the UN, while other states, often undemocratic, authoritarian and totalitarian, are not subjected to comparable criticism. In addition, these states often act as arbiters of compliance with international laws and human rights regarding the State of Israel.⁸ In the current discourse, a double standard is widely applied, for example, in the case of Ukraine's conflict. People who fully support Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression often question Israel's right to defend itself against Hamas and other terrorist organisations.

The third 'D' symbolises the 'Delegitimisation' of the State of Israel. Expressions that deny the right of the State of Israel to exist can be defined as antisemitic.

A specific manifestation of the new antisemitism is the global movement known by the acronym BDS,⁹ which stands for "Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions". The BDS movement denies the right of the Jewish people to self-determination and seeks to delegitimise Israel through its diplomatic, political, economic, academic, professional and cultural isolation. The international campaign is organised and coordinated by the Palestinian BDS National Committee and is strongly linked to terrorist organisations, including

⁸ UN Watch Database. *Is the UN living up to its founding principles?* Online. Available from: <https://unwatch.org/database/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁹ See the movement's website: <https://bdsmovement.net/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.¹⁰ Since the campaign was launched in 2005, many left-wing progressive groups have joined the movement.

At this point, we consider it necessary to emphasise that criticism of Israel itself is not antisemitic. However, denying the right of the Jewish people to self-determination and the legitimacy of the State of Israel is undoubtedly antisemitism, and it takes many forms:

- labelling Israel as an illegal colonialist entity
- revisionist historical analogies between German National Socialism and the current situation in Israel, Gaza or the West Bank
- identifying Zionism with racism
- using terms such as “genocide”, “apartheid”, “ethnic cleansing”, or “Holocaust” to describe Israeli policy towards the Palestinians, etc.

¹⁰ More on the topic, e.g.: State of Israel. Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Public Diplomacy. *Terrorists in Suits. The Ties Between NGOs promoting BDS and Terrorist Organizations*. Online. 2019. Available from: https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/generalpage/terrorists_in_suits/en/De-Legitimization%20Brochure.pdf. [Accessed 2025-04-30].
ADL. *FAQs on the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) Movement on Campus*. Online. 2024. Available from: <https://notoleranceforantisemitism.adl.org/resources/blog/faqs-boycott-divestment-sanctions-bds-movement-campus>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].



January, X



February, Facebook



"Boycott Israel", October, Vkontakte



December, Vkontakte

Especially in connection with the rise in antisemitism after October 7, 2023, there has been an increase in incidents that the IHRA defines as “holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel”. For example, the phrase “Free Palestine” may not in itself be an expression of antisemitism; however, the same phrase deliberately placed near a site associated with the Jewish community is an antisemitic act. This is because a political proclamation is addressed to the Czech Jewish community, thereby symbolically holding it responsible for the actions of the State of Israel.



The inscription “Free Palestine” on concrete barriers in front of the Jerusalem Synagogue, July, Prague. Source: FJC

3 | CATEGORISATION OF ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS

In 2024, the FJC recorded a total of 4,694 antisemitic incidents, which are classified in the following chapters according to type, target, content, ideology, and medium. The boundaries between categories can be blurred, and an incident may be classified into more than one category. For example, vulgar statements are often accompanied by physical aggression or threats. Similarly, new antisemitism and Holocaust denial can be combined. In such cases, the dominant category is always selected based on analysis.

When describing the ideological motivation or background of antisemitic incidents, the AR works with terms that have not yet been codified in Czech law. The definitions of terms such as “extremism”,¹¹ “disinformation” and “prejudiced hatred” are therefore taken from the methodology of the Czech Republic’s Ministry of the Interior.¹²

Categorisation enables the identification of current trends in anti-Jewish hatred through quantitative analysis and year-on-year comparisons.


¹¹ Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. *Co je extremismus*. Online. 2010. Available from: <https://mv.gov.cz/clanek/co%e2%80%90je%e2%80%90extremismus.aspx>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

¹² Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. *Definice dezinformací a propagandy*. Online. Available from: <https://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/clanek/definice-dezinformaci-a-propagandy.aspx>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].


The limited scope of this report prevents the inclusion of comparative graphs across all categories. Therefore, only tables and graphs that illustrate key findings are selected in the following sections.

TOTAL NUMBER OF RECORDED ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS FOR 2024		4,694
BY TYPE		
Physical assault against an individual		4
Texts, images, audiovisual representations		4,670
Attack on Jewish property, desecration		12
Threats, insults, harassment		8
ACCORDING TO TARGET		
Targeted		118
General		4,576
BY CONTENT		
Physical aggression		16
Threatening, endorsing, justifying or inciting physical attack		94
False, dehumanising, demonising, vulgar or stereotypical claims and conspiracy theories		2,227
Denial of the fact, scope and mechanism of the Holocaust		122
The new antisemitism and BDS		2,235
ACCORDING TO IDEOLOGY		
Right-wing extremism		993
Left-wing extremism		886
Islamism		296
Ultra-conservative Christian fundamentalism		70
Disinformation platforms		1,516
Unspecified		933
ACCORDING TO MEDIUM		
Personal confrontation and interaction		5
Public space		162
Letters and emails		13
Printed media		11
Internet		4,503

4 | ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS BY TYPE



In terms of the type of antisemitic incidents, the general category, which includes texts, images, and audiovisual expressions, has long been dominant. These incidents are primarily spread in the virtual environment. They contribute to the normalisation of anti-Jewish hatred and can thus fuel the radicalisation of a part of society.



Physically manifested antisemitism remains statistically insignificant; however, last year set a historical record in this regard, indicating a growing level of aggression among perpetrators.

Antisemitically motivated violence occurs only rarely in the Czech Republic. Between 2020 and 2023, two violent attacks were recorded (in 2020 and 2021). However, in 2024, four cases of physical assault against an individual were recorded. All occurred in the context of the Middle East conflict.

Similarly, in 2024, there were 12 recorded cases of attacks on and desecration of Jewish property. This is the highest number in history and double the number compared to 2023, when the FJC recorded six incidents of this

kind. For accuracy, it is necessary to add that this category includes only cases of vandalism directly against Jewish properties and does not include dozens of similar incidents that occurred in their vicinity.

A physical assault against an individual is one that results in bodily harm or is intended to cause bodily harm.

PHYSICAL
ATTACK

Physical assault on a man in a public place. The attack was preceded by a chance meeting and a spontaneous conversation, during which the attacked man presented pro-Israeli views.

December, Brno

Attack on Jewish property, desecration. An attack on Jewish property or property perceived to be Jewish-related is a type of incident committed to damage, desecrate, or symbolically deface property, which includes, for example, the destruction of Jewish sacred buildings, cemeteries or monuments, the painting of Nazi symbols on Jewish objects and other acts of vandalism.



An unknown perpetrator smeared the area in front of the synagogue with animal blood, January, Polná. Source: FJC



The inscription “KILL THE JEWS” on the entrance door of the New Synagogue in Libeň, December, Prague.
Source: FJC

Threats, insults and harassment are any written or verbal expressions directed against the Jewish community, Jews or those perceived to be Jews. These incidents may occur during personal interaction, by telephone, mail, email, social media, and other communication platforms.

A group of men repeatedly shouted slogans such as “Fucking Jews” from the restaurant’s garden towards the synagogue where a concert was taking place. The men then tried to get into the synagogue’s entrance area.

August, Prague

IN-PERSON
COMMUNICA-
TION

“You must throw bombs because you are desperate people lost on the road (...) so out of cowardice you murder others (...).”

Quote from a letter sent to one of the Prague rabbis, December, Prague

POSTAL
LETTER

Texts, images, audiovisual representations. This category includes expressions of antisemitism that are not addressed to a specific person, institution or Jewish property. This includes, for example, publicly uttered statements, chants and banners at demonstrations, posters, graffiti, videos, articles, publications and all manifestations of antisemitism on the Internet, social media and communication platforms.

SOCIAL
MEDIA

"Israel is already worse than Hitler."

July, Instagram

SOCIAL
MEDIA

"Jew and a Nazi as well, you killed Jesus you will suffer for it until the judgment day. That's why you have no home anywhere."

February, social network X




April, Vkontakte




September, Vkontakte

5 | ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO TARGET



The ratio of targeted to general incidents has not changed significantly over the last five years. In terms of absolute numbers, incidents directed against specific persons or institutions have long been a statistically marginal category. However, immediately after October 7, 2023, there was a sharp increase in the occurrence of targeted incidents. Last year confirmed this trend and brought two historical highs: the highest number of these

incidents and, simultaneously, their highest share of the total volume of collected data. In 2024, 118 targeted incidents were recorded (compared to 72 incidents in 2023), constituting 2.49% of the total number (compared to 1.66% in 2023).



Targeted incidents are those directed against a specific person, object or institution. This category also includes attacks on Jewish property or on property that is perceived to be connected to Jews, intending to deface the property in real or symbolic terms.

The category of **general** incidents includes all antisemitic incidents that do not have a specific victim or target.



Targeted incident: an unknown vandal damaged two newly placed Stolpersteine (stumbling stones) in Beroun, May. Source: Town of Beroun¹³



Targeted incident: an unknown vandal painted and defaced concrete blocks in front of the Jerusalem Synagogue, July, Prague. Source: FJC

¹³ Town of Beroun. *Neznámý vandal poničil pamětní kameny*. Online. 2024. Available from: <https://www.mesto-beroun.cz/pro-obcany/aktualne/aktuality/neznamy-vandal-ponicil-pametni-kameny-9495cs.html>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].



Targeted incident: an unknown vandal tore down and damaged posters with portraits of people who were kidnapped to Gaza on October 7, 2023. The posters were posted on the perimeter wall of the Old Jewish Cemetery, November, Prague. Source: FJC

“Get lost jew (sic)”


SOCIAL
MEDIA

“I feel, rabbi, that you are just a spokesman for a racist genocidal state.
You will have to be punished according to the law.”

“I think your concern will only grow because the world is fed up with you
and will react to your war crimes, whether you play the eternal victim or
you squeal words like Antisemitism in a high C.”


Insults addressed to one of the Czech rabbis, December, social network X

6 | ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS BY CONTENT




In terms of the content of antisemitic incidents, the general category of false, dehumanising, demonising, vulgar, or stereotypical statements and conspiracy theories has always been dominant. The second most numerous category was manifestations of new antisemitism. The year 2024 marks a historic turning point: for the first time in the long-term monitoring of anti-Jewish

hatred in the Czech Republic, new antisemitism has become the prevailing form. At the same time, the number of incidents associated with traditional stereotypes and conspiracies decreased year-on-year by more than 23%.



The sharp increase in new antisemitism began immediately after the events of October 7, 2023. In 2024, the FJC recorded 2,236 incidents, accounting for almost 48% of the total. Compared to 2023, when 1,242 incidents were recorded, this represents an 80% increase. The primary cause of this alarming development is the massive wave of reactions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the ongoing normalisation of anti-Jewish prejudiced hatred. Legitimate criticism of Israeli policy often escalated into the delegitimation and demonisation of the State of Israel, its citizens, and

the Jewish diaspora. Furthermore, the application of the principle of collective guilt against Jews for Israeli policy and the situation in the Middle East is a trend that had been strengthening within the European Union even before October 7, 2023.¹⁴



Traditional conspiracy myths and stereotypical antisemitic prejudices, which formed the second largest content-based group of incidents in 2024, often intersected with manifestations of new antisemitism. An example of this is the spread of disinformation about Israel's military intentions accompanied by hateful statements about "typical Jewish treachery". Also

¹⁴ E.g.: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. *Jewish People's Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism*. Online. 2024, pp. 14, 29–32, 62. Available from: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-experiences-perceptions-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

heavily represented were various theories about a “Zionist conspiracy” in relation to the events of October 7, 2023, derogatory antisemitic imagery, and classic assertions about “Jewish interests” controlling the media and manipulating global politics.

However, a year-on-year increase to a historical maximum is evident across all monitored categories. Alongside cases of physical aggression, the number of incidents belonging to the group of Holocaust denial and distortion has risen notably. In 2024, the FJC recorded 122 such incidents, compared with 83 in 2023, representing a 47% increase.

Physical aggression includes cases of physical assault against individuals and attacks on Jewish property, its vandalism or desecration.



A participant in the “March of Goodwill” carrying an Israeli flag was attacked by an unknown passerby. The passerby tried to snatch the flag from his hand, and during a physical altercation, he intentionally broke its wooden pole, April, Prague. Source: social networks

An unknown perpetrator threw a homemade Molotov cocktail into the grounds of the Jewish cemetery. The improvised explosive device failed, and no damage was caused.

May, Telč

VANDALISM

Threats, endorsements, justifications or incitements to physical attack can be directed against individuals, institutions and the State of Israel in a targeted or general form.

A young man walking past a Jewish school building and an adjacent Israeli goods store shouted "Sieg Heil".

May, Praha

IN-PERSON
COMMUNICA-
TION

"The jews (sic) are too big for their boots, action must be taken firmly!"

April, Pokec24.cz

DISCUSSION
POST



July, social network X


False, dehumanising, demonising, vulgar or stereotypical claims and conspiracy theories. This category includes both traditional and modern myths about Jewish characteristics, a Jewish world conspiracy and accusations of Jews for being more loyal to the State of Israel rather than their own countries.



April, Threads




"Trust the Plan. The Plan:
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion",
July, Telegram



August, Gab

Denial of the fact, scope and mechanism of the Holocaust. This category includes incidents that deny or trivialise historical facts about the deliberate genocide of the Jewish people by Nazi Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II, for example, questioning the existence of gas

chambers, mocking and belittling the number of Jewish victims, or accusing Israel or the Jews of inventing the Holocaust or exaggerating it. This also includes accusations that the Jews themselves are to blame for their genocide or that they are abusing their historical legacy. The trivialisation of the Holocaust can also be manifested by using the term itself and its symbolism for events in contexts that have nothing to do with the Holocaust.



January, Gab

“Jews deliberately overstated the number of Holocaust victims because they were demanding unjust reparations and restitution for the alleged victims. It was also planned in advance so that the Holocaust would remain a tool for antisemitic accusations, at least for 100 years, for the Jewish discrimination against the Gentiles.”

June, Gloria.tv

SOCIAL
MEDIA

“Forget their fake Holocaust. It's all a hoax.”

October, Hrdinove.net

ONLINE
ARTICLE

Ursula Haverbeck: prosím, pojdte dál a já vám povím jednu starou židovskou pohádku.



“Ursula Haverbeck: Please come in, and I will tell you an old Jewish fairy tale.” December, Telegram¹⁵

“New antisemitism and BDS” refers to the category of incidents that deny the Jewish people’s right to self-determination, question the legitimacy of the State of Israel, apply behavioural standards to it that are not applied to other democratic nations, or collectively blame Jews for the policies of the State of Israel. This includes, for example, claims that the existence of the State of Israel is based on racism, apartheid, or colonialism; comparisons of contemporary Israeli actions to Nazi policies; accusations of genocide, ethnic cleansing, etc. A significant manifestation also includes calls for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) or for the comprehensive international isolation of Israel. These calls, framed as a form of non-violent resistance, often in reality target Jewish individuals and institutions regardless of their connection to the State of Israel. A frequent element is also the use of the slogan “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free,” which, in the context it is commonly used, implies the destruction of Israel. This type of antisemitism is difficult to clearly identify because it is often expressed using language typically associated with human rights activism – for example, support for minorities or calls for international justice. Conse-

¹⁵ Ursula Haverbeck is a German senior citizen who has been repeatedly convicted for denying Nazi crimes. She has publicly claimed that extermination camps, such as Auschwitz, were not designed for the mass murder of Jews, and has called the Holocaust “the most enduring historical lie”. See Wikipedia. *Ursula Haverbeck*. Online. Available from: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ursula_Haverbeck. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

quently, many manifestations of anti-Jewish prejudiced hatred remain unrecognised or are downplayed, not only by the general public but also by parts of the expert, media, and activist communities. It is essential to reiterate here that criticism of the State of Israel is not classified as an antisemitic incident unless it meets the criteria of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism.

“Israhell roasted its own babies using tanks and Apache helicopters so it could ‘take revenge’ and steal territory that doesn’t belong to it. Death to the occupiers and eternal shame to Zionists around the world who celebrated this massacre without knowing the facts...”

July, social network X¹⁶

SOCIAL
MEDIA

“Whatever the Zionist state of Israel does is passed over in silence. But whoever defends itself against Israel and its terror against non-Jews, whether it be the Persians and Iran, who face liquidation at their consulates by Israeli missiles, or the Palestinians in Gaza, who face genocide with bombs hitting refugee camps, they will be immediately shouted down from Prague.”

April, Aeronet.news

ONLINE
ARTICLE



June, Vkontakte



January, Facebook

¹⁶ “Israhell” is the Czech version of the combination of the English words “Israel” a “hell”.



September, social network X




The inscription “Izrahell”¹⁷ on the facade of a building in the city centre.
April, Prague. Source: FJC

DISCUSSION
POST

“All that Israel can do is to murder civilians on the West Bank and Palestine and plunder Palestinian resources.”

August, iDNES.cz

¹⁷ See note 16.




Handwritten note “Free Palestine from Israel” on a poster for the Festival of Environmental and Decolonisation Perspectives, March, Prague. Source: FJC



“All Zionists Are Bastard.”¹⁸ Flyer placed on the wall of the Old Jewish Cemetery, August, Prague. Source: FJC


¹⁸ “A.Z.A.B” is a variation of the acronym ACAB, “All Cops Are Bastards”.

7 | ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO IDEOLOGY



Antisemitism is a phenomenon that permeates the entire political and social spectrum with varying intensity. The FJC has long been monitoring manifestations of anti-Jewish hatred from the ideological positions of the far-right, the far-left, Islamism, and ultra-conservative Christian fundamentalism. Disinformation platforms create a separate category that draws on all extremist ideologies. The disinformation ecosystem includes websites, social networks, and chain emails. Disinformation media are very often

pro-Kremlin and linked to anti-system movements.¹⁹ From a methodological perspective, the origin of an antisemitic incident can only be determined if it appears on a clearly classifiable media platform or if the author or attacker explicitly identifies with a specific ideology or religious extremism. All incidents for which determining the ideological origin is not possible are categorised as “unspecified”.




¹⁹ For the definition of terms associated with the extremist scene FJC is using the methodology of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. See Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. *Výroční zprávy o extremismu a koncepcie boje proti extremismu*. Online. 2025. Available from: <https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/extremismus-vyrocní-zpravy-o-extremismu-a-strategie-boje-proti-extremismu.aspx>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

Analysis of the 2024 data allows for the identification of six main trends:

■ The most numerous category was manifestations of antisemitism on disinformation platforms. The FJC recorded 1,516 incidents, representing 32.3% of the total. Both these figures are comparable to 2023, when 1,422 incidents, representing 32.86%, were recorded. In terms of ideology, several significant shifts have occurred over the past six years. In 2019 and 2020, the most frequent antisemitic incidents were those without apparent ideological motivation. In 2021 and 2022, the far-right dominated. In 2023, for the first time in history, incidents associated with the disinformation scene were the most common. Until the beginning of 2019, anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim narratives prevailed in disinformation conspiracies. In 2020-2021, their main topic was COVID-19. Shortly after the invasion of Ukrainian territory by the Russian Federation in 2022, the disinformation ecosystem pivoted to open pro-Kremlin propaganda. Following the events of October 7th, disinformation platforms began massively spreading lies and manipulation directed against the State of Israel. In terms of content, anti-Jewish conspiracy theories and manifestations of new antisemitism predominated in these incidents.

The disinformation ecosystem always reacts to the current societal discourse, into which it projects traditional prejudicial patterns. Thus, antisemitism is not present as a separate topic but forms a universal ideological framework. A typical example is disinformation conspiracies about alleged Jewish influence on media, global financial systems, or world organisations. The questioning of the legitimacy of the State of Israel and its demonisation also frequently appear, often through manipulative comparisons to Nazism or by labelling Israel as the “real aggressor”. The capacity of these platforms to transcend ideological

boundaries presents a significant societal risk. Antisemitic content from disinformation sources is adopted not only by extremists, who find confirmation of their existing prejudices in it, but also by individuals without clear ideological alignment. These individuals then further spread these narratives, particularly in the environment of social networks.




- The second most numerous category consisted of manifestations of antisemitism associated with the far-right extremism (also abbreviated as FRE). The FJC recorded 993 incidents. Compared to 2023, when 885 incidents were recorded, representing a 12% increase. The far-right dominated the statistics in 2021 and 2022. While the absolute number of far-right antisemitic manifestations increases annually, their share of

total incidents has decreased significantly over the last three years. While in 2021 the far-right accounted for nearly 47% of the spread of anti-Jewish hatred, this figure fell to around 21% in 2023 and 2024.

Extremists identifying with Nazism, fascism, or militant nationalism expressed racial and ethnic hatred. They campaigned against immigration, the Roma minority, Ukrainian refugees, the LGBT+ community, European institutions, etc. In the period before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the FRE scene focused primarily on issues related to the fight against COVID-19. After the outbreak of Russian aggression against Ukraine, a significant part of the far-right adopted pro-Kremlin disinformation. In 2024, far-right antisemitic expressions were most often based on classic stereotypes and conspiracy myths about Jews as a hidden elite controlling media, finance, and politics. A relatively exclusive topic is the denial, distortion, trivialisation, or mockery of the Holocaust. Supporters of the extreme right commit more than 65% of these incidents. In relation to the war between Israel and Hamas, the FRE scene, among other things, adopted the Islamist and leftist narrative of new anti-semitism but focused primarily on the demonisation of the State of Israel, which was portrayed as a global manipulator or an instrument of “Jewish power”.


- The third most numerous category consisted of antisemitic incidents without a clear ideological background. The FJC recorded 933 incidents, representing 19.88% of the total. Compared to 2023, when 1,413 incidents were recorded, representing a 34% decrease.

Cases of general anti-Jewish hatred traditionally appeared primarily on social networks and in the comments section of news servers. The posts



took the form of vulgar, hateful, or stereotypical statements and new antisemitism. These were isolated incidents, and their authors or disseminators did not exhibit any long-term antisemitic activity.

Until 2023, cases without an identified ideology always constituted roughly one-third of all antisemitic manifestations. In 2024, their share fell below 20% for the first time, while the number of incidents involving perpetrators aligned with one of the extremist ideological streams rose significantly. The progressing polarisation and radicalisation of society can explain this inverse relationship.




- Historically, manifestations of antisemitism associated with the far-left were a completely marginal phenomenon. Although their number saw a slight year-on-year increase, the figures always remained low, consistently totalling in double digits. In the Czech context, the extreme left was associated primarily with orthodox communism, the anarchist movement, and small activist organisations linked to the BDS movement. However, the situation changed radically immediately after the terrorist attack of October 7, 2023. The number of antisemitic incidents grew at an unprecedented rate. In 2023, the FJC recorded 287 incidents, representing 6.63% of the total and an increase of 226% compared to 2022. In 2024, this trend reached a historical peak. There were 886 recorded

incidents, representing 18.88% of the total and a 209% year-on-year increase. The content was almost exclusively new antisemitism.

The left-wing scene underwent rapid radicalisation and established a formidable presence in the public debate. Hateful anti-Jewish narratives, which were considered socially unacceptable before October 7, 2023, were gradually adopted by almost all left-leaning groups. Antisemitic rhetoric was advanced by a wide array of groups, from human rights and environmental organisations to feminist and artistic circles and was particularly prevalent within parts of academia. In an environment that declares itself as humanistic and oriented towards the fight for social and global justice, antisemitism became the norm. A comparison of data from 2022–2024 confirms that this was not a one-time statistical anomaly, but the initial stage of a consolidated trend in both online and offline spaces. Furthermore, many left-wing initiatives attempted to institutionalise this trend and turn it into a systemic and legitimate part of public discourse.

- In 2024, parts of the left-wing structures overlapped with and mutually reinforced the Islamist scene. This ideological symbiosis, or practical cooperation between the far-left and Islamist activism, manifested particularly through the sharing of argumentative frameworks, public appearances, and communication channels. Both groups organised joint events, shared slogans and media campaigns, and amplified their reach through frequent cross-posting on social media. The alignment in content was especially evident in the denial of Israel's right to exist and its systematic demonisation.

Indeed, the narratives of new antisemitism are behind the dramatic increase in the number of incidents stemming from Islamism. Following



the events of October 7, 2023, Islamism was the fastest-growing ideological motivation for anti-Jewish hatred. In 2024, the FJC recorded 296 incidents, representing 6.31% of the total and a year-on-year increase of 40%. Islamist propaganda, which has long questioned the right of Jews to self-determination, massively entered the public sphere through the left-wing scene. So-called “pro-Palestinian” activism became a cover name for calls to destroy Israel.

- The only extremist ideological current in which the influence of October 7th was not reflected is ultra-conservative Christian fundamentalism. Incidents originating from this ideological spectrum must be viewed as

private initiatives at odds with the conclusions of the Second Vatican Council. The authors of these incidents radically diverge in their views from the official positions of the Catholic Church and other Christian denominations, which, on the contrary, actively stand against antisemitism. In terms of content, the incidents are frequently built upon myths and stereotypical claims stemming from religiously motivated hatred or conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, long-term data show these manifestations of antisemitism remain a statistically marginal phenomenon.

Disinformation platforms



June, V Kontakte



October, V Kontakte



October, Cz24.news



December, social network X



January, Telegram

Right-wing extremism



January, Vkontakte



March, Vkontakte



November, social platform Bastyon



September, Vkontakte

"Swindlecaust is holy."²⁰

January, Facebook

SOCIAL
MEDIA

"...every alleged Holocaust survivor has in fact turned out to be the same, a fraud. In reality, the entire Holocaust story is, always has been, and always will be a complete monstrous fairy tale."

November, Gojim.net

ONLINE
ARTICLE

²⁰ "Swindlecaust" is a combination of the German word "Swindle", meaning fraud or deception, and the word "Holocaust".

Unspecified



May, Facebook



November, Facebook

SOCIAL MEDIA

“The Palestinians are at home there, and the Jews only with the UN's complicity, because they didn't even want them in America. They should be grateful for every day that someone gives them a bit of space and not murder those who are their hosts.”

October, social network X

DISCUSSION POST

“Jews are always victims. And especially when they occupy foreign territory for decades, bloodily terrorise the local population, or even openly commit genocide. After all, Jews are the chosen people, untouchable victims of the Holocaust, and they have the sacred right to expand their Lebensraum to their ‘historical territories’ that God promised them. Howgh, Amen, Holocaust.”

February, Novinky.cz

Left-wing extremism



January, Facebook



Banners on a demonstration, April, Prague.
Source: A2larm.cz

"Modern terrorism, mass murder, genocide in this time, Israelis are murderous monsters, murderous inhuman beings, monsters from hell, and they have done hell in Palestine and to the Palestinian people!"

May, Instagram

SOCIAL
MEDIA

"If the world wants to save itself, it must immediately reduce Israel to atoms..."

October, social network X

SOCIAL
MEDIA

"This does not mean that we have to immediately abandon this year's Christmas celebrations, just like in Bethlehem. However, we can try to avoid anything that supports Israel and the genocide it is committing.

During our eager shopping, we can financially support the starving in Gaza, and most importantly, spread awareness that even during this year's 'season of peace and goodwill', Israel is denying peace to millions of people in the 'Holy Land'."

December, Denikreferendum.cz

ONLINE
ARTICLE

Islamism



May, Facebook



September, Facebook



April, Facebook



August, Facebook

“Defensive Jihad against the enemy is an obligation for all Muslims. The Zionist enemy aggression against Gaza, Jerusalem, al-Aqsa and all of Palestine, attacks faith, lives, honour and property, requires defence and must be stopped. It is a Sharia duty of every Muslim who is able to do so, until this enemy aggression ends and cannot be repeated.”

August, E-islam.cz

ONLINE
ARTICLE

Ultra-conservative Christian fundamentalism

“What do we see? A country where symbolic spiritual giants, the Khazars and Chabat Lubavitch are behind the curtain, who, like Haman, have prepared a sword with which they want to exterminate us.”

June, World-eyesbible.com

ONLINE
ARTICLE

“I wrote here about how the Jews/Judaists attacked the Church of Christ from the beginning, for one reason only: because they were on Satan’s side. The Judaists tried to infiltrate the early Christian Church, with the aim of enslaving and controlling it.”

July, Granosalis.cz


DISCUSSION
POST

“Israel, the Synagogue of Satan (...) there will be no peace on Earth until Israel disappears from the map.”

December, Gloria.tv



SOCIAL
MEDIA

8 | ANTISEMITIC INCIDENTS ACCORDING TO MEDIUM




The term “medium” in the title of this chapter refers to the communication channel through which the antisemitic incident occurred.

- The virtual environment has long played an unequivocally key role in the spread of antisemitism. In 2024, 4,503 incidents originated from the online space, accounting for 95.93% of the total. In 2023, this figure was 98.01%, and in 2022, it was 97.1%.



Traditionally, the largest group has been expressions of anti-Jewish hatred on social networks. The FJC recorded 3,364 incidents, representing 74.71% of all online incidents. This proportion has remained constant over the long term, even as the number of recorded incidents increases year on year.


Social media provides users with relative anonymity while simultaneously enabling the rapid replication and mass dissemination of problematic content. In the Czech environment, materials from foreign-language accounts are frequently adopted. Users share content without changes or add a loose translation or commentary. The recycling of older or thematically unrelated visual posts with new captions is also common. The



same motif thus circulates across platforms and gradually acquires a local context through hashtags or hyperlinks.


Hateful content was disseminated by individuals on their personal profiles as well as by groups, uniting like-minded people. For some of them, anti-Jewish rhetoric is a stable part of their virtual identity and a long-cultivated image.

- A statistically significant trend is associated primarily with manifestations of antisemitism in public spaces. This category includes all public events, vandalism, or entries in the guest books of institutions related to the Jewish community. Anti-pandemic measures and the shift of most activities to the online environment led to a noticeable decline during the COVID years of 2020 and 2021. Following the events of October 7,



2023, this category saw a significant increase that continued throughout 2024, culminating in 162 public manifestations of antisemitism, a 184% rise compared to the previous year.

■ The majority of these incidents occurred at public gatherings, demonstrations, protests, debates, lectures, cultural events, etc. These involved shouted slogans and chants, banners, and statements by speakers. In the past, the FJC recorded only a few isolated incidents. A radical change occurred in response to the events of October 7th. In the last three months of 2023, 24 demonstrations and other public events took place where cases of anti-Jewish hatred appeared, primarily in the form of demonisation and delegitimisation of the State of Israel. The year 2024 saw a historical maximum,



with the FJC documenting antisemitic manifestations at 73 public events organised by pro-Palestinian activists. This figure represents a nearly three-fold increase compared to 2023. In this context, it is pertinent to note that social networks are not only the primary platform for spreading antisemitism but also a key tool for organising events in public spaces.

A significant group of incidents in public spaces involves various forms of vandalism, such as posters, stickers, graffiti, etc. The FJC recorded 61 cases, more than five times the number compared to 2023 (12 incidents). The targets included properties associated with the Czech Jewish community (synagogues, memorials, cemeteries, etc.) as well as unrelated locations (public transport stops, shop windows, building facades, street furniture, etc.).

Social media



November, Vkontakte



October, Facebook

Online articles

ONLINE
ARTICLE

“The truth is that the Palestinians have been suffering genocide for decades at the hands of the Zionists, who, time and time again, are eager to seize more territory and settlements and kill in cold blood the inhabitants who do nothing but work and try to survive despite all the oppression and harm (...).”

January, Avant-garda.com

ONLINE
ARTICLE

“In all the countries that the Jews have penetrated, they have settled perfectly, occupying all the parasitic economic niches (...).”

July, Myslenkyocemkoliv.blogspot.com

ONLINE
ARTICLE

“The power of the Israeli lobby in the United States and Western countries, combined with Christian Zionism, is a toxic mixture, a drink that allows the ‘Jewish state’ to successfully pursue its policy of genocidal extermination with impunity.”

September, Infokuryr.cz

ONLINE
ARTICLE

“Jews professing Judaism are the only nation in the world that has invented the myth of its ‘divinity’ and openly promotes this alleged divinity and its intolerance towards other nations and religions.”

December, Celostnivzdelavani.cz

Discussion posts

DISCUSSION
POST

“If Israel hadn’t behaved like Hitler during World War II, there would be no reason to protest.”

January, Novinky.cz

“Jews have only themselves to blame for the fact that they have been a hated and therefore discriminated nation for millennia.”

May, Novarepublika.cz

DISCUSSION
POST

“The chosen nation has torn off the false mask of a victim, with which it has fooled the whole world for years, claiming how everyone is supposedly hurting it, and it has turned out to be a war criminal, committing genocide in a live broadcast.”

November, Reflex.cz

DISCUSSION
POST

Audio and video

“The Zionists denied any possibility of being considered a civilised nation when they rounded up Palestinians and herded them into tunnels as human shields or mine-sweepers. The Wehrmacht did this many years ago, or perhaps not even the Wehrmacht, but rather the SS (...). The victims (...) behave exactly like the Nazis.”

October, Protiproud.info

AUDIO
VIDEO

Personal confrontation and interaction

“I want to film a man here who supports the biggest terrorist, Israel. It suits you, Mr Zionist!”

Statement by a participant in an anti-Israel demonstration, March, Prague

IN-PERSON
COMMUNICA-
TION

“Look at the Jews here during World War II, and now they are committing the same thing, a genocide.”

Statement by a taxi driver during a ride with a customer, December, Prague

IN-PERSON
COMMUNICA-
TION

Printed media

PRESS

“[The USA and the United Kingdom] (...) protected Israel from even the lightest slap on the wrist, to such an extent that now almost the entire Israeli society feels entitled to commit genocide.”

March, printed edition of the anarchist revue Existence

Letters, emails and phone calls

EMAIL

“So, you servants of evil, you will soon see what will happen to you. Your time is drawing near. Seriously look forward to it, you perfidious Jews. We are ready for you.”

E-mail sent to Jewish Community of Prague (JCP) employees, May, Prague

Public space




February, Brno. Source: FJC



Jewish star and the inscription “JUDE” on the humanitarian aid centre, December, Prague. Source: Instagram



"Jews are our greatest misfortune", sign at a bus stop, June, Lovosice.
Source: FJC



A swastika painted below a Jewish star
in the former Prague Jewish town, April,
Prague. Source: FJC




Posters at an anti-Israel demonstration,
July, Prague. Source: PrahaIN.cz

9 | STATISTICAL DATA ON ANTISEMITISM

9.1 | ANTISEMITISM ACCORDING TO FJC STATISTICS

The Federation of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic recorded a total of 4,694 antisemitic incidents in 2024. Compared to 2023, when 4,328 incidents were recorded, this represents an increase of 8.46%. In the long term, the data for the past year represent a historical maximum; however,



the sharp increase evident in previous years has stopped. For predicting future developments, this finding could seemingly be a reason for cautious optimism. However, an analysis of the statistical data shows that the severity of antisemitic incidents increased dramatically following the events of October 7, 2023. In 2024, anti-Jewish prejudiced hatred became a legitimate and socially accepted part of public debate.

9.2 | ANTISEMITISM ACCORDING TO STATISTICS FROM THE POLICE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

The Police of the Czech Republic regularly publish statistical reports²¹ to analyse the current state of crimes and their trends. To process data on criminal activity, the police use the so-called ‘Tactical and Statistical Classification’ (TSC) with its coding of individual crimes (and their combination) and classify them with a specific designation. For better clarity, the statistics cited in this chapter are arranged according to the relevant sections of the Czech Criminal Code (Act No. 40/2009 Coll.).

Using the published data, the FJC monitors the number of recorded criminal acts with an antisemitic motive or undertone for each of the following eight selected crimes:²²

²¹ The total number of recorded acts according to the TSC for 2024 can be found here: Police of the Czech Republic. *Statistické přehledy kriminality za rok 2024*. Online. 2025. Available from: <https://policie.gov.cz/clanek/statisticke-prehledy-kriminality-za-rok-2024.aspx>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

²² All data in this chapter are sourced from: The Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. *Zpráva o projevech extremismu a předsudečné nenávisti na území České republiky v roce 2024*. Online. 2025, pp. 19–22. Available from: <https://mv.gov.cz/clanek/extremismus-vyrocnizpravy-o-extremismu-a-strategie-boje-proti-extremismu.aspx>. [Accessed 2025-06-01].


- Sections 145–146a – Grievous Bodily Harm
- Section 228 – Damage to a Thing of Another
- Section 228/2 – Spraying, covering with drawing or text by paint or another substance
- Section 352 – Violence Against a Group of People and Individuals
- Section 353 – Dangerous Threatening
- Section 355 – Defamation of Nation, Race, Ethnic or other Groups of People
- Section 356 – Instigation of Hatred towards a Group of People or Suppression of their Rights and Freedoms
- Section 358 – Disorderly Conduct (at sports and public events)
- Section 403 – Establishment, Support and Promotion of Movements Aimed at the Suppression of Human Rights and Freedoms
- Section 404 – Expressing Sympathies for Movements Seeking to Suppress Human Rights and Freedoms
- Section 405 – Denial, Impugnation, Approval and Justification of Genocide

In 2024, a total of 173,322 criminal offences were recorded in the territory of the Czech Republic, of which 159 were bias-motivated crimes (88 solved). In a year-on-year comparison, the number of hate crimes reported decreased by 22.

HATE CRIMES	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Sections 145–146a of the Criminal Code	3	2	9	16	7
Section 228 of the Criminal Code	0	0	15	7	7
Section 228/2 of the Criminal Code	5	9	22	14	11
Section 352 of the Criminal Code	23	35	46	42	54
Section 353 of the Criminal Code	0	16	10	17	13
Section 355 of the Criminal Code	29	20	17	25	19
Section 356 of the Criminal Code	34	26	28	58	46
Section 358 of the Criminal Code	1	0	2	2	2
Sections 403–405 of the Criminal Code	39	0	0	0	0
Total:	134	108	149	181	159

Within the overall dataset, the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic monitors statistics on criminal activity motivated by hatred towards selected victim groups or targets of attack. In 2024, 33 criminal offences with an antisemitic motive were recorded. Compared to 2023, this represents an increase of 15 offences.

HATE CRIMES AGAINST SPECIFIC GROUPS	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
In total	134	108	149	181	159
Jews	27	37	25	18	33
Roma	19	33	20	25	17
LGBT+	not available	11	13	13	14
Ukrainians	not available	not available	not available	not available	71



The Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic states every year that the “collected data does not reflect latent criminality and does not take into account crimes that, for various reasons, were not detected, reported, and thus recorded”.²³

9.3 | COMPARISON OF STATISTICAL DATA

The data sets of the Police of the Czech Republic and the FJC statistics are not directly comparable, primarily for three reasons:

- Nationwide, police crime statistics include only cases that meet the factual criteria for the crime. The published data, therefore, does not include less socially harmful illegal acts, such as misdemeanours dealt with in administrative proceedings by municipal authorities. Whereas the FJC registers all incidents regardless of their degree of social harm.
- The police predominately record incidents reported by victims or witnesses. The FJC, on the other hand, actively seeks out manifestations of anti-Jewish hatred. The number of reported antisemitic incidents has long been a statistically marginal part of monitoring. In 2024, the FJC received 139 notifications which could be verified, documented and added to the database. Thus, reported incidents account for 3%. At the same time, however, the reported incidents are usually among the most serious.

²³ Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. *Zpráva o projevech extremismu a předsudečné nenávisti na území České republiky v roce 2024*. Online. 2025, p. 19. Available from: <https://mv.gov.cz/clanek/extremismus-vyrocní-zpravy-o-extremismu-a-strategie-boje-proti-extremismu.aspx>. [Accessed 2025-06-01].

- The Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, as well as many European institutions, draws attention to the underreporting of antisemitic and hate crimes, especially in the online environment.

The completeness of the TSC data can also be influenced, for example, by the degree to which the criteria of the non-legally binding IHRA definition of antisemitism are applied in common practice. However, a definitive explanation of the data analyses is beyond the capabilities of the FJC and this report.

10 | PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS

During 2024, several public opinion surveys regarding the attitudes of the Czech population towards antisemitism, Israel, Palestine, or the Middle East conflict in general were conducted or published. Selected data that may be relevant for the comprehensive report are presented in the following chapters.²⁴

10.1 | PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH CENTRE

The Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM), which is a research department of the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, conducted a survey titled “The Czech Public on Events in Israel and Palestine – February 2024” between January 26 and March 11.²⁵ The survey results were published at the end of April:

²⁴ Due to the limited scope of this report, the following research project of the Herzl Center for Israel Studies is not included in the overview see: Kalhousová, I., Komarová, S., Plíštilová, T., Smetana, M., Vranka, M. (2024). *Elite-public gaps in attitudes towards Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: new evidence from a survey of Czech parliamentarians and citizens*. In *East European Politics*, 41(1), pp. 142–158. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2024.2415641>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].


²⁵ Public Opinion Research Centre (CVVM). Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences. *Česká veřejnost o dění v Izraeli a Palestině*. Online. 2024. Available from: <https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/images/articles/files/5821/pm240424.pdf>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

- 35% of the Czech public is interested in developments in the Middle East. Interest increases with age, higher education, and greater interest in politics
- 40% of citizens attribute the blame for the escalation of the conflict to both sides, 22% blame the Palestinians, and 6% blame Israel. Respondents who lean towards the right more often blame the Palestinians, while sympathisers of the left-centre more often blame either Israel or both sides.
- 46% of those surveyed agree with the international recognition of Palestine as an independent state, while 23% are opposed. People who clearly identified themselves as left-wing were more likely to agree strongly. Respondents who disagree with the establishment of an independent Palestinian state more often attribute the blame for the origin and escalation of the conflict to the Palestinians.
- 4% of respondents described the Hamas terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, as justified and proportionate, whereas 72% of the Czech public disagreed with this assessment.
- 47% of citizens agree with the justification of the Israeli army's retaliatory operation in the Gaza Strip, while 26% disagree. In terms of political orientation, as one moves from left to right, agreement with the justification of the Israeli military operation increases.
- 34% of the public assesses the Israeli army's actions as proportionate, while 37% assesses them as disproportionate.

10.2 | STEM (Institute for Empirical Research)

The STEM research institute conducts an annual survey that measures the attitudes of the Czech public towards twenty-eight selected countries, as

well as foreign politicians and political figures. Respondents award each country a point rating on a scale from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). In June 2023, four months before the October 7th attack, the top three positions in the ranking were Slovakia, Switzerland, and Austria.²⁶ Conversely, Palestine was rated as the worst. Israel finished in 23rd place, ahead of Ukraine, Turkey, China, and Russia. A year later,²⁷ the overall ranking and the ratings of individual countries remained almost unchanged, with a statistically significant deterioration observed only for Israel and Palestine. The most likely explanation for the decline in the popularity of both states is the influence of the events of October 7th.



²⁶ STEM. *Hodnocení vztahu občanů České republiky k vybraným zemím Evropy a světa během války na Ukrajině*. Online. 2023. Available from: <https://www.stem.cz/hodnoceni-vztahu-obcanu-ceske-republiky-k-vybranim-zemim-evropy-a-sveta-behem-valky-na-ukrajine-2/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

²⁷ STEM. *Postoj české veřejnosti k většině zemí zůstává stabilní, pohoršil si Izrael s Palestinou*. Online. 2024. Available from: <https://www.stem.cz/postoj-ceske-verejnosti-k-vetsine-zemi-zustava-stabilni-pohorsil-si-izrael-s-palestinou/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

10.3 | EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has so far conducted three surveys investigating how European Jews perceive anti-semitism and what experiences they have with it. The first two surveys took place in 2012 and 2018, and the third update was completed just before the events of October 7th. The survey was conducted from January to June 2023 in 13 EU countries,²⁸ including the Czech Republic,²⁹ and its results were published in July 2024.³⁰

In the Czech Republic, 471 people who identify as Jewish participated in the survey. Across all monitored parameters, the Czech Republic had the best statistical results among participating countries. Nevertheless, the survey results are alarming: 95% of Czech respondents have encountered antisemitism in their daily lives, more than half hide their Jewish identity, 12% avoid Jewish sites due to safety concerns, and almost a third of respondents have been the target of antisemitic harassment or discrimination. At the time this report was written, FRA did not have any statistical data on the extent to which the situation worsened after October 7, 2023.


²⁸ Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, Hungary, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Austria, Romania, Spain, Sweden.

²⁹ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. *Jewish people's experiences and perceptions of antisemitism. Country data – Czechia*. Online. 2024. Available from: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/antisemitism_survey_2024_-_country_sheet_czechia_0.pdf. [Accessed 2025-04-30].


³⁰ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. *Jewish people's experiences and perceptions of antisemitism*. Online. 2024. Available from: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2024-experiences-perceptions-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

FRA SURVEY

I consider antisemitism as a big problem in my life.



I think that antisemitism in Czechia has increased in the last five years.



I have encountered antisemitism in my daily life in the year before the survey.



I encountered online antisemitism all the time in the year before the survey.



I am very worried about antisemitic harassment.




I am very worried about being attacked.




I avoid wearing Jewish symbols in public at least occasionally.



I avoid Jewish events because I do not feel safe as a Jew.



I think that the Arab-Israeli conflict has an impact on my feeling of safety.




I feel I am blamed at least occasionally for the Israeli government's actions because I am Jewish.



I experienced antisemitic harassment in the year before the survey.



I felt discriminated against because of being Jewish in the year before the survey.




I reported the last episode of antisemitic harassment.



I reported an incident of online antisemitism.



I have considered emigrating in the past 5 years for reasons related to being Jewish.



Respondents in Czechia



The survey average



10.4 | ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the world's leading organisation dedicated to fighting antisemitism, prejudiced hatred, and extremism, has been conducting annual updates to its *Global 100* survey since 2014. The 2024 data³¹ confirms that 46% of the world's adult population harbours deeply ingrained antisemitic attitudes. This is the highest recorded figure in history and more than double the percentage compared to the first survey in 2014.

The Czech Republic³² according to the ADL survey, shows the lowest level of antisemitism in the Eastern European region,³³ This placed it 11th out of all 103 countries monitored. Anti-Jewish prejudices are held by 15% of the Czech adult population. The following overview presents selected statements from the survey and the percentage of respondents who agree with the content of the statements:

³¹ ADL. *Press release. 46 % of Adults Worldwide Hold Significant Antisemitic Beliefs, ADL Poll Finds*. Online. 2025. Available from: <https://www.adl.org/resources/press-release/46-adults-worldwide-hold-significant-antisemitic-beliefs-adl-poll-finds>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

³² ADL. *The ADL Global 100: Index of Antisemitism*. Online. 2024. Available from: <https://www.adl.org/adl-global-100-index-antisemitism>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

³³ ADL classifies Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Ukraine in the Eastern Europe region. The survey was not conducted in countries not included in this list.

ADL SURVEY

Jews' loyalty is only to Israel.



Jews have too much power in the business world.



Jews still talk too much about what happened to them in the Holocaust.



Jews don't care about what happens to anyone but their own kind.




Jews have too much control over global affairs.



Jews think they are better than other people.



Jews have too much control over the media.



People hate Jews because of the way Jews behave



Should your country boycott Israeli products and businesses?



What are you impressions of Israel? Favorable?



What are you impressions of Palestine? Favorable?



What are you impressions of Hamas? Favorable?



Hate targeting Jews is a serious problem in the world.



11 | FROM THE INTERNET TO ATTACK: THE CASE OF THE BRNO SYNAGOGUE

Annual reports on antisemitism consistently state that the Czech Republic is a safe country for the Jewish community. The results of the FRA and ADL surveys, which allow for comparison with other countries and regions, fully confirm this conclusion. However, the FJC also regularly warns about the continuous increase of antisemitism on social networks and cautions about the radicalisation of its users. Anti-Jewish hatred online is not confined to the virtual sphere; it constantly threatens to erupt into physical violence. Online verbal attacks or the spread of conspiracy theories and prejudiced narratives cannot be dismissed as insignificant expressions by anonymous users. On the contrary, they represent a serious risk. The attempted arson attack on the Brno synagogue demonstrated that security concerns are more than justified.

On Monday, January 29, 2024, shortly after midnight, two teenagers unsuccessfully attempted to set fire to the Agudas Achim synagogue in Brno. They placed a lit spray canister filled with a flammable mixture in front of the building and quickly fled the scene. The improvised explosive device failed to detonate. The police later released a photograph of both perpetrators and asked the public to help identify them.³⁴

³⁴ Ivánek, Lukáš. *Brněnská synagoga v ohrožení: zapálená láhev před dveřmi, v hledáčku dva mladíci*. Online. Brněnský deník. 27. 02. 2024. Available from: <https://brnensky.denik.cz/krimi/zapalena-lahev-synagoga-brno-skorepka-poznate-je-dva-mladici-hledani-svedku.html>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

The police classified the incident as an attempted terrorist act. In the following months, a covert investigation was conducted as part of an international operation codenamed MERDA. The investigation resulted in the arrest of five individuals aged 13 to 18; some of them were active not only in the Czech Republic but also in Slovakia, Austria, and the United Kingdom. Two suspects were charged with supporting and promoting terrorism, inciting hatred, and attempting a terrorist attack. One of the suspects was also recruiting individuals to participate in fighting in Syria.³⁵ During house searches, cold weapons, gas pistols, military equipment, and items with extremist symbolism were seized.

The Security Information Service (BIS) and the National Centre Against Terrorism, Extremism and Cybercrime (NCTEKK) announced in June 2025 that the detainees had been swiftly radicalised in the online environment through social networks and an online communication platform. The content the suspects engaged with included support for the so-called Islamic State, endorsement of Islamist attacks, promotion of jihadism, and the spread of hatred against the LGBT+ community, Jews, and other minorities.³⁶

In the Czech context, this is a landmark case where online antisemitism escalated into an attempted violent attack on a Jewish target. In its 2024

³⁵ ČTK. *Pětice mladíků na sítích propadla Islámskému státu. V Brně se pokusili zapálit synagogu, jsou dva obvinění*. Online. iROZHLAS.cz. 25. 06. 2025. Available from: https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/petice-mladiku-na-sitich-propadla-islamskemu-statu-v-brne-se-pokusili-zapalit_2506251210_jho. [Accessed 2025-06-30].

BIS. *BIS a NCTEKK odhalily skupinu podezřelých z podpory a propagace terorismu*. Online. 2025. Available from: <https://www.bis.cz/aktuality/bis-a-nctekk-odhalily-skupinu-podezrelych-z-podpory-a-propagace-terorismu-3760c3d4.html>. [Accessed 2025-06-30].

³⁶ ČTK, ČT24, Škoda, Jan. *Policie odhalila pokus o zapálení synagogy v Brně*. Online. ČT 24. 25. 06. 2025. Available from: <https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/clanek/domaci/kriminaliste-a-bis-oznamuji-vysledky-protiteroristickeho-zasahu-362301>. [Accessed 2025-06-30].

annual report, the BIS highlights a clear trend of youth radicalisation online – on platforms like Telegram and TikTok – noting a growing willingness among some individuals to commit real-world violent acts.³⁷ Similarly, the Ministry of the Interior, in its 2024 report on extremism, emphasised the growing influence of radical content on social networks and online communities that share the notion of violence as the only means to achieve a goal.³⁸



Perpetrators of the attack on the Brno synagogue, January, Brno. Source: Brnensky.denik.cz

³⁷ BIS. *Výroční zpráva za rok 2024*. Online. 2025, p. 24. Available from: <https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocní-zpravy/2024-vz-cj.pdf>. [Accessed 2025-07-15].

³⁸ Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. *Zpráva o projevech extremismu a předsudečné nenávisti na území České republiky v roce 2024*. Online. 2025, p. 13. Available from: <https://mv.gov.cz/clanek/extremismus-vyrocní-zpravy-o-extremismu-a-strategie-boje-proti-extremismu.aspx>. [Accessed 2025-06-01].



Screenshots from the video "Police of the Czech Republic: International Operation MERDA". Source: Police of the Czech Republic

12 | THE NORMALIZATION OF ANTISEMITISM

12.1 | A LETTER FROM THE VANDAL

On Tuesday, November 7, 2023, one month after the Hamas terrorist attack, the Olomouc Museum of Art covered its display windows with posters featuring portraits of people abducted to Gaza.³⁹ The installation was vandalised five weeks later, when a young man, his face hidden by a hood, tore down the posters – an act captured on security cameras. Numerous Czech media outlets reported on the incident, which the police began investigating. Subsequently, the Museum of Art featured a photo report in one of its display windows, documenting the November poster installation and displaying pictures of the individual responsible for the vandalism.⁴⁰

The results of the police investigation have not yet been made public. However, at the beginning of February 2024, an anonymous letter arrived at the address of Petr Papoušek, the chairman of the FJC, in which the Vandal explained his motivation. The limited scope of this report prevents the

³⁹ ČTK, iDNES.cz. *Olomoucké Muzeum umění polepilo své výlohy plakáty lidí unesených Hamásem*. Online. iDNES.cz. 07. 11. 2024. Available from: https://www.idnes.cz/olomouc/zpravy/muzeum-umeni-vyloha-plakaty-hamas-izrael-unosy-podpora.A231107_165816_olomouc-zpravy_stk. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁴⁰ ČTK. *Z výlohy strhal portréty unesených Hamásem. Muzeum v odvetě vylepilo jeho fotografii*. Online. ČT 24. 18. 12. 2023. Available from: <https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/clanek/regiony/olomoucky-kraj/z-vylohy-strhal-potrety-unesenych-hamasem-muzeum-v-odvete-vylepilo-jeho-fotografii-344270>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

inclusion of the full text; therefore, we present the following selected excerpts:

"Dear Mr Papoušek, or any other person reading this letter,

This is the Vandal – the Vandal who damaged the Museum of Art's display window. If you do not wish to read further, the purpose of this letter is to make it clear that the Vandal would never harm a person based on their origin, that they do not necessarily agree with the abduction of hostages, and that when they appear in the annual report on manifestations of anti-semitism in the Czech Republic, the Vandal would prefer to be placed in the category of left-wing extremism, specifically in the subgroup of new antisemitism. Even though the Vandal does not completely identify with the definition (...), it still seems less bad to them than if the act were interpreted as that of a right-wing extremist (...).

(...) The Vandal does not have, and never has had, anything against Jews as a religious group, and considers the act they committed to be anti-Zionist, taking a stand against the genocide being perpetrated by the so-called State of Israel (...), not antisemitic.

(...) The Vandal (...) disagrees with Israel's apartheid regime.



Posters installation in the windows of the Olomouc Art Museum, November 2023, Olomouc. Source: iDNES.cz

(...) Overall, the Vandal would like to say that they disagree with all the definitions that, according to the FJC, hide behind 'antisemitism' (...). The Vandal does not claim that racism or discrimination doesn't exist in other democratic countries (...). However, in no other democratic country are the conditions as extreme as in Israel and the occupied territories.

(...) The Vandal, for understandable reasons, does not wish to reveal their identity (...), does not consider themselves an extremist, and would like to maintain a clean criminal record.

(...) The Vandal is not a supporter of Hamas. They disagree with violence and would describe themselves as a left-winger and a vegetarian, a voter for the Pirate Party, and a religious agnostic.

(...) The Vandal would compare the situation to the events in Ireland before 1988. Irish Republicans detonated bombs in city centres, killing civilians indiscriminately; they shot at civilians, including children. (...) The Vandal's position is that, even though they disagree with violence, they believe that the Irish Republicans had the moral right to defend themselves against occupation and oppression.

(...) As the Vandal stated, they are a left-winger and a vegetarian, and even though the so-called State of Israel has a higher percentage of vegans than



Torn down posters,
December 2023,
Olomouc Art
Museum. Source:
Hanacka.drba.cz

any other territorial entity in the world, it also, surprisingly, has a lot of far-right voters (...).

(...)


From the river to the sea, xoxo,

The Vandal”

The Vandals’ act and their letter contain several characteristics that are common to the majority of anti-Israel activism:

Anonymity. Some activists act in their own name, but the majority of group initiatives remain anonymous. Petitions and appeals have no authors; they have only signatories. The organisers of demonstrations and protests maintain their anonymity.

Destruction. Anti-Israel activists are dedicated to subverting our values. They do not build, they destroy. They vandalise public spaces and properties associated with the Jewish community, disrupt demonstrations, misuse significant anniversaries, spread slander, and attack the reputation of Israel and ideological opponents.



Letter from The Vandal. Source: FJC

Symbolic humiliation or destruction of Israel. Posters with the portraits of hostages abducted to Gaza became a symbol of Israel, much like its flag. Desecrating the symbol, questioning history, and persistent defamation are almost ritual acts.

Negative activism. The Vandal's act could not realistically or symbolically contribute to improving the desperate situation of the Palestinians. Activism mostly consists of gestures whose aim is not to help Palestinians but to harm Israel.

Demonisation. Anti-Israel activism portrays the Jewish state as the darkest global force, a universal culprit, and the source of all evil. The description of Israel takes the form of a list of sins without mitigating circumstances, while the other side of the conflict bears no responsibility.

Delegitimisation. According to the Vandal, Israel is a “so-called state”, and Jews are merely a “religious group” with no right to national self-determination.

Double standards. The Vandal is a prime example of internal contradictions shaped by emotions rather than facts. They disagree with violence, but Hamas has a moral right to it. Upholding human rights is a challenge for all democratic states, but only in the case of Israel is it considered a total failure.

Ignorance. The Vandal's lack of knowledge of basic facts is excusable and legitimate. However, their activism based on ignorance is prejudiced.

Falsification of reality. Lies, manipulation, switching the roles of perpetrator and victim, concealment of facts, etc., are standard tools of anti-Israel activism.

Selective activism. For the Vandal, it is as if no other aspects of the Middle East conflict exist. They are not interested in any other religious or ethnic group in Israel and the Palestinian territories. In reality, they are not even interested in the Palestinians themselves. They are not troubled by their living conditions in Syria or Lebanon, the Egyptian blockade of Gaza, or the dangers

that Hamas poses to Palestinians. Similarly, for the vast majority of anti-Israel activists, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the only problem in the contemporary world. They do not engage with any other armed conflict currently taking place. The objectively tragic and often hopeless situation of Palestinians in Gaza is not the reason, but the pretext, for hatred towards Israel.

Denial of antisemitism. The Vandal does not consider themselves an antisemite because they disagree with the definition of antisemitism that characterises them as one.

Ideological Lens. Above all, the Vandal fears being considered a right-wing extremist. Leftist progressivism reduces reality to a distorted schema: the smaller, weaker, or poorer party is automatically in the right, and the truth is on their side.

Moral Kitsch. A black-and-white view of the world through an ideological lens and the ostentatious empathy of selective activism are the essence of moral kitsch.

At this point, it is essential to reiterate that criticism of the State of Israel and its policies is entirely legitimate, even necessary. However, “criticism that is to be of any value requires knowledge and can only be taken seriously if it adheres to the truth. When it abandons truth in the interest of preserving a prejudiced, hateful framework, it ceases to be criticism and becomes demagoguery.”⁴¹

The following chapters use selected examples to describe certain aspects of the spread of the anti-Israel narrative and its supporters. The Vandal is just one of many.

⁴¹ Drda, Adam. *Kdo je antisemita?* Online. Bubínek Revolveru. 26. 03. 2024. Available from: <https://www.bubinekrevolveru.cz/kdo-je-antisemita>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

12.2 | MESSAGE CONTENT: THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL

The words and symbols used by the pro-Palestinian scene in relation to Israel are deliberately stripped of their original meaning and context. They have become manipulative labels and slogans based on feelings. Emotions are presented as facts, and complex reality is reduced to hashtags. Terms like “apartheid”, “fascism”, “ethnic cleansing”, etc., have no basis in reality. But they are trivial, generally understandable, endlessly repeated, and therefore effective. Zionism, in this distorted interpretation, is not a Jewish national movement but a “colonialist”, “imperialist”, or “racist” project. The claim that Israel has “occupied” Palestine since 1948 de facto denies its right to exist and the right of Jews to self-determination. Calls to “end the colonial Zionist movement”, for the “end of Zionism”, or to “decolonise Palestine” are literal calls for the destruction of Israel. Equating Zionism with fascism, Nazism, or racism then seemingly morally justifies and legitimises these calls. The fight against “Zionism” is framed as a struggle for democracy, justice, and human rights. Its proponents pretend to be a dissenting voice for a silenced minority, advocating universal humanist values. Pro-Palestinian activism masquerades as a solidarity movement, but in reality, it is an expression of anti-Jewish hatred.



Solidarity march with Palestine,
January, Prague. Source:
PrahaIN.cz



Academics Against Apartheid: "We believe that true peace will only be achieved by listening to the indigenous Palestinians and aiding their fight by calling for an end to the colonial Zionist movement." Source: Instagram



"Israel is not defending itself, it has been occupying since 1948."
Solidarity march with Palestine, April, Prague. Source: DenikAlarm.cz



“Decolonise Palestine.” Protest in front of the Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, May, Prague. Source: DenikAlarm.cz



Event “Against Israeli Genocide Against Palestinians”, April, Prague. Source: Facebook

“Deal of the Century = Theft of the Century.” Manipulative and false map often used in propaganda about Israel’s “colonisation of Palestine”.⁴² Palestinian Week, July, Prague. Source: Facebook

⁴² Luděk. *Tomáš Klus zveřejnil video na podporu Gazy, je plné faulů*. Online. Novinky.cz. 15. 3. 2024. Available from: <https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-tomas-klus-zverejnil-video-na-podporu-gazy-je-plne-faulu-40464334>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].



"Zionists are fascists. Israel is apartheid." The organisers of the protest meeting invited participants to bring chalk and write "the names of child victims of the Israeli genocide on the ground", October, Prague. Source: Facebook



Where did they get their inspiration?
Since 1897, in the ideology of Zionism

- | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Yesterday | Today |
| Hitler (20th century) | Netanyahu (21st century) |
| (about "inferior races") | (about Palestinians) |
- They are enemies; we must destroy them one by one!
 - They are animals!
 - We are superior (chosen)!

A typical motif of new antisemitism is the equating of Israel with National Socialist Germany. The text on the poster adds another dimension to this motif by labelling Zionism as a source of inspiration for Nazism. Solidarity March for Palestine, January, Prague. Source: social networks

12.3 | FROM THE RIVER TO THE SEA, PALESTINE WILL BE FREE

The slogan ‘From the River to the Sea, Palestine Will Be Free’, which is historically associated with calls for the physical liquidation of the State of Israel and its Jewish inhabitants, was heard in 2023 in the Czech Republic at most pro-Palestinian demonstrations. On Wednesday, 15 November, representatives of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, the police, and the Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office agreed that using this slogan can constitute a criminal offence.⁴³ In response to this decision, pro-Palestinian activists attempted to organise a demonstration in support of the slogan. On Monday, 27 November, the organiser filed a request at the Prague City Hall to hold the demonstration on 5 December. On Thursday, 30 November, City Hall, referring to the decision of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, the police and the Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office,⁴⁴ denied permission for the event.⁴⁵ The demonstration organiser subsequently contested Prague City Hall’s decision with a lawsuit. On Monday, 18 December, the Municipal Court in Prague annulled the ban on the demonstration as illegal. In an extensive justification, the court stated that the slogan “can have multiple meanings” and that “in the Czech environment, it cannot be determined whether the meaning is predominantly hateful, radical or

⁴³ Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic. *Použití hesla „From the River to the Sea“ může být za určitých okolností trestným činem*. Online. Available from: <https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/pouziti-hesla-from-the-river-to-the-sea-muze-byt-za-urcitych-okolnosti-trestnym-cinem.aspx>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁴⁴ On Friday, December 1, 2023, the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office published on its website a *General statement on the possibilities of legal assessment of hate speech in connection with the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli-Palestinian armed conflict*. Online. Available from: https://verejnazaloba.cz/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/1_sl_732_2023_14_male_stanovisko.pdf. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁴⁵ ČTK. *Zakázaná propalestinská demonstrace. Praha zakročila kvůli sloganu, aktivisté chystají žalobu*. Online. iROZHLAS.cz. 01. 12. 2023. Available from: https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/praha-magistrat-slogan-palestina-demonstrace-zakaz_2312012237_ava. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

even genocidal”.⁴⁶ Prague City Hall filed an appeal against this decision at the beginning of 2024.⁴⁷ In August of the same year, the Supreme Administrative Court essentially upheld the Municipal Court of Prague’s legal opinion⁴⁸ and in the ruling⁴⁹ stated:

“In the proceedings before the municipal court (...), it was clarified through an appointed expert that the controversial slogan can have up to five different meanings depending on the context. Only two of them are associated with calls for violence. Furthermore, these impermissible genocidal meanings of the slogan are not yet unambiguously dominant, even in the context of the terrorist attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023. Therefore, the Magistrate could not, without further argumentation, adopt a generalised conclusion that the controversial slogan itself amounts to an incitement to deny or restrict the rights of members of the Jewish community. Consequently, the Magistrate could not preventively ban the announced assembly solely on the grounds that it was convened in support of the controversial slogan, if the declared purpose was to support the understanding of this slogan in its non-violent meaning. Similarly, it could not impose an unconditional demand on the organisers of the assembly to refrain from chanting the controversial slogan, which would also apply to its permissible meanings and connotations.”

⁴⁶ The verdict is available here: <https://www.zakonyprolidi.cz/judikat/msph/14-a-166-2023-84>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁴⁷ Dimun, Petr. *Pražský magistrát trvá na škodlivosti hesla o svobodné Palestině, podal kasační stížnost*. Online. Česká justice. 27. 02. 2024. Available from: <https://www.ceska-justice.cz/2024/02/prazsky-magistrat-trva-na-skodlivosti-hesla-o-svobodne-palestine-podal-kasacni-stiznost/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁴⁸ Soukup, Jaroslav. *Kvůli heslu From the river to the sea nelze zakázat shromáždění, záleží na kontextu, rozhodl NSS*. Online. Novinky.cz. 29. 08. 2024. Available from:

<https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-kvuli-heslu-from-the-river-to-the-sea-nelze-zakazat-shromazdeni-zalezi-na-kontextu-rozhodl-nss-40485885>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁴⁹ Supreme Administrative Court. *NSS se vyjádřil k možnostem omezení užívání hesla „From the River to the Sea, Palestine will be free“ na shromážděních*. Online. Available from: <https://www.nssoud.cz/aktualne/tiskove-zpravy/detail/nejvyssi-spravni-soud-se-vyjadril-k-moznostem-omezeni-uzivani-hesla-from-the-river-to-the-sea-palestine-will-be-free-na-shromazdenich>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

The FJC continues to consider the mentioned slogan entirely unambiguously as a manifestation of anti-Jewish hatred.

Moreover, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) highlighted a statement by former Hamas leader Khaled Mashal. In an interview for the Kuwaiti Amar Taqi's Podcast in January 2024, he confirmed that the only meaning of the slogan is indeed the destruction of Israel.⁵⁰ He also expressed satisfaction that students in Europe and America have adopted the slogan.



Statement by former Hamas leader Khaled Mashal on Kuwait's Amar Taqi's Podcast. Source: MEMRI

⁵⁰ The interview is available on the social network X: https://x.com/MEMRIReports/status/1749049490009440569?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1749049490009440569%7Ctwgr%5E44a2a642cea34029a8583992091113d982ca4ba3%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thejc.com%2Fnews%2Fisrael%2Fhamas-leader-says-october-7-renewed-dream-of-palestinian-state-from-the-river-to-the-sea-sb7q37c8. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

12.4 | ANONYMOUS NETWORKING

We appeal “to all organisations and individuals who are not indifferent to the ongoing Israeli policy of apartheid, colonisation, and occupation in the Palestinian territories to use their activities to help hold Israel accountable for its actions, including war crimes, and thereby contribute to the Palestinian people gaining real human rights and dignity.”⁵¹

“We have come to convey the voice of the millions of Palestinian women and men living under Israeli apartheid (...). The voice of the millions of Palestinian women and men facing long-standing and systematic brutal practices of Israeli settler colonisation, imprisonment, torture, home demolitions, expulsion from the land... The voice of the Palestinian women and men who are no longer with us because they were killed as a result of Israel’s war crimes in the Gaza Strip or in other Palestinian territories occupied by Israel.”⁵²

Both quotes use the same language to discuss the same topic and give the impression that they come from a single text. However, the first is from 2010, the second from 2024. The narrative of new antisemitism does not change over time because its basic premise does not change: the destruction of the State of Israel. Both quotes, however, originate from the same source: ISM Czech Republic,⁵³ the Czech branch of the BDS movement. Its

⁵¹ ISM Czech Republic. *30. březen – Globální BDS den akcí*. Online. 2010. Available from: <https://ism-czech.org/2010/03/30/30-brezen-globalni-bds-den-akci/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁵² ISM Czech Republic. *Lidská práva jsou buď univerzální, nebo nejsou – Prohlášení iniciativy Ne našim jménem! k narušení jedné lidskoprávní konference*. Online. 2024. Available from: <https://ism-czech.org/2024/10/03/lidska-prava-jsou-bud-univerzalni-nebo-nejsou-prohlaseni-iniciativy-ne-nasim-jmenem-k-naruseni-jedne-lidskopravni-konference/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁵³ ISM - International Solidarity Movement.

members also organise the petition group “Not in Our Name! – Initiative for a Just Peace in the Middle East”. ISM (since 2010) is connected to the long-active Facebook group “Association of Friends of Palestine” and the civic association “Palestinian Club in the Czech Republic” (since 1999). Jana Ridvanová and Zdeněk Jehlička represent and act on behalf of ISM.

Before October 7, 2023, ISM was the only, and entirely marginal, platform attempting to promote the agenda of new antisemitism systematically. Following a post published on its website on November 29, 2022, there was a year-long silence. A visit by B. Netanyahu was announced for October 2023; he was supposed to come to the Czech Republic accompanied by other members of the Israeli government. ISM called for a protest demonstration on October 8th. However, the state visit was cancelled in response to the terrorist attack, so the planned demonstration did not take place.⁵⁴ On October 7th,



“Netanyahu in Prague. No business with war criminals.” Poster for a demonstration planned for October 8, 2023, in Prague. Source: ISM Czech Republic

⁵⁴ ISM Czech Republic. *Tisková zpráva: Odvolání nedělní demonstrace (08.10.2023)*. Online. 2023. Available from: <https://ism-czech.org/2023/10/08/tiskova-zprava-odvolani-nedelni-demonstrace-08-10-2023/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

ISM issued a cautiously worded press release that interpreted the Hamas terrorist attack as a legitimate act of resistance and blamed Israel: “The initiatives that in recent days have distributed the Statement against the joint action of the Czech and Israeli governments and the welcoming of Prime Minister Netanyahu in Prague express regret over the bloodshed in Israel-Palestine and condemn attacks on civilians, which constitute a war crime. The root causes of the current conflict are directly attributable to Israel and its military occupation, which bears responsibility for the prevailing conditions in the occupied Palestinian territories, including the blockaded Gaza Strip. International law through the UN provides Palestinians with the right to resist occupation, including armed resistance, but exclusively against military targets.”⁵⁵

Approximately one week after the terrorist attack, ISM began intensive activity that has not ceased since. J. Ridvanová, Z. Jehlička, and their collaborators organise protests, demonstrations, and petition drives, publish hundreds of texts, and appear in the media. Simultaneously, anonymous groups began to appear on social media, sharing a similar visual style and content. Together with ISM, they created and, throughout 2024, strengthened an effective and robust ecosystem of anti-Israel activism. These include, for example, the following groups:

- Academics Against Apartheid
- Brno4Palestine
- Dekolonizujte Palestinu (Decolonise Palestine)
- Plzen4Palestine
- Prague4Lebanon
- Prague4PalestineYouth

⁵⁵ ISM Czech Republic. *Tisková zpráva: Vyjádření k posledním událostem v Izraeli-Palestině*. Online. 2023. Available from: <https://ism-czech.org/2023/10/07/tiskova-zprava-vyjadeni-k-poslednim-udalostem-v-izraeli-palestine/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

- Proti dehumanizaci: případ Palestiny a Izraele (Against Dehumanization: The Case of Palestine and Israel)
- Solidarita s Palestinou Olomouc (Solidarity with Palestine Olomouc)
- Stop the Siege Brno
- United4Gaza etc.

The virtual ecosystem is interconnected with many other initiatives, particularly from the far-left environment, for example: Poslední generace (Last Generation), Univerzity za klima (Universities for Climate), Socialistická solidarita (Socialist Solidarity), the Antifascist Platform of the Left, the Czechoslovak Anarchist Association, the feminist collective Sdružení, the queer-feminist association Pangea, the feminist web magazine Druhá : směna (The Second : Shift), etc. The various anonymous groups also involve renowned human rights and humanitarian organisations in their activities, such as Doctors Without Borders or People in Need. Despite their fundamental anonymity, they systematically build their image as a legitimate and trustworthy voice in public debate – a voice of anti-Jewish hatred.



Invitation to a protest co-organised by Prague4PalestineYouth and the queer-feminist association Pangea on the occasion of International Women's Day, March 8th. Source: Instagram

12.5 | ACADEMIA

One of the main target groups of the pro-Palestinian movement is university students. A key organiser of student events has become the anonymous Instagram group Academics Against Apartheid (AAA),⁵⁶ which spreads its calls in synergy with other anonymous groups on social networks. The AAA platform was established directly in response to the events of October 7th and, in 2024, organised several protest gatherings, petitions,⁵⁷ propaganda workshops or lectures, and unsuccessfully attempted to orchestrate the destruction of the professional reputation of Dr Irena Kalhousová, the director of the Herzl Centre of Israeli Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University.⁵⁸ Despite repeated calls for mobilisation, it was not possible to replicate the massive student protests and occupation strikes that took place in the form of improvised encampments in the USA and Western Europe.

A unique feature of antisemitism in the Czech academic environment is the fact that teaching staff participated in its spread much more than students. Since October 2023, several educators have participated in the activities of the pro-Palestinian movement, either as direct participants or as their defenders in the media, at public forums, and, of course, within their teaching.

This intensive but uncoordinated activism gained an institutionalised form in September 2024. The Initiative for a Critical Academy (IZKA) began its

⁵⁶ The Instagram profile of the Academics Against Apartheid group is available here: <https://www.instagram.com/academics.against.apartheid/?hl=cs>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁵⁷ E.g: Academics Against Apartheid. *Petice za neobnovení smlouvy o výměně studentů mezi Univerzitou Karlovou a Hebrejskou univerzitou v Jeruzalémě*. Online. 2024. Available from: https://www.petice.com/petice_proti_programu_vymny_student_mezi_uk_a_huji. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁵⁸ Tykalová, Tereza. *Aktivisté žádají konec pedagožky Univerzity Karlovy a přednášky o „genocidě v Gaze“*. Online. iDNES.cz. 06. 05. 2024. Available from: https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/domaci/izrael-palestina-karlova-univerzita-kalhousova-akademici-proti-apartheidu.A240506_110702_domaci_tty. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

activities before the start of the new academic year.⁵⁹ A mission statement was published on the newly created website,⁶⁰ which replicates traditional anti-Israel propaganda, albeit in a sophisticated and seemingly neutral language. The statement contains many contradictions. The most obvious is the discrepancy between the general humanistic phrases and their actual content. For example, IZKA considers it essential for the academic sphere to adopt “value-based positions” on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while simultaneously declaring itself the sole representative of an “ethical, yet critical expert perspective”. It accuses all ideological opponents of being “uninformed” or having “ideological prejudices”.

The declaration has no authors; it has only signatories. The initiative itself has no spokespersons, organisers, or individuals acting on its behalf. As with other anti-Israel groups, IZKA's activities are completely anonymous.⁶¹



Academics Against Apartheid: protest in front of the building of the Faculty of Humanities of Charles University, May, Prague. Source: DenikAlarm.cz

⁵⁹ The website of the Initiative for a Critical Academy (IZKA) is available here: <https://www.criticalacademy.cz/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁶⁰ IZKA. *Prohlášení Iniciativy za kritickou akademií*. Online. 2024. Available from: <https://www.criticalacademy.cz/prohlaseni-iniciativy-za-kritickou-akademii/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁶¹ More on the IZKA topic, e.g., here: <https://protiantisemitismu.substack.com/p/faqs>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

12.6 | ČTK (The Czech Press Agency)

The media scene undoubtedly contributed to the gradual normalisation of the narratives of new antisemitism. Shortly after October 7th, news and (journalist/commentary) platforms began positioning themselves based on how they interpreted the war in the Middle East. A detailed media analysis exceeds the scope, possibilities, and purpose of this report; however, it is possible to cite the example of the Czech News Agency (ČTK), whose reports were used by the majority of media outlets.

In December 2023, the Council of the ČTK unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the press agency to start referring to the Hamas movement as a “terrorist organisation” instead of using the adjective “radical”.⁶² The agency decided to accept the call at the end of January 2024.⁶³ At the end of June, the news server Novinky.cz published a review of ČTK articles, based on which it found that the agency had retreated from its position in January. “ČTK now uses the designation ‘Palestinian movement’ for Hamas in the vast majority of cases, or occasionally ‘radical Palestinian movement’ or just ‘movement’. The agency thus refers to Hamas in the same way as the far-left outlets Alarm or Voxpot.”⁶⁴ In response to the article, the Council of the ČTK received complaints, the content of which it unanimously agreed

⁶² Czech News Agency Council. *Usnesení Rady České tiskové kanceláře č. 35/2023 ze 190. zasedání konaného dne 11. 12. 2023*. Online. 2023. Available from: <https://www.ctk.cz/o-ctk/rada-ctk/usneseni/?id=3750>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁶³ Menšík, Jan. *ČTK mění přístup. Hamás bude označovat jako teroristickou organizaci*. Online. Novinky.cz. 31. 01. 2024. Available from: <https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-ctk-meni-pristup-hamas-bude-oznacovat-jako-teroristickou-organizaci-40459099>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁶⁴ Vaculík, Radim. *Agentura ČTK ustoupila od označování Hamásu za „teroristické hnutí“*. Online. Novinky.cz. 26. 06. 2024. Available from: <https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-agentura-ctk-ustoupila-od-oznacovani-hamasu-za-teroristickou-organizaci-40477931>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

with in July.⁶⁵ The labelling of Hamas was the subject of several other Council resolutions, but the topic faded from public debate.

The dispute over the adjective (designation) is not at all trivial. Relativised language signals relativised values and a distorted reality. The openly declared goal of Hamas is the destruction of the State of Israel. This genocidal intent is expressed in both versions of its charter. The term “radical” is semantically neutral in itself, and its connotations are defined by context. A “radical lifestyle change” can be for the better or for the worse. The designation “radical” is misleading when associated with Hamas and can even be a first step towards its defence.

12.7 | ART SCENE

Pro-Palestinian activists pushed their agenda primarily through intensive social media activity, which was also adopted by the domestic art scene in the spring 2024. While this engagement was a passing trend for many participants, it nonetheless had a significant and lasting impact on public discourse.

On Saturday, March 30, the Anděl Music Awards ceremony took place. Several Czech artists used the media attention to express their stance on the conflict in Gaza. They unfurled a banner on stage, reading “Artists for Cease-fire”, and wore a badge featuring a red hand. They thus imitated the gesture of their foreign colleagues at the Oscar awards in Hollywood three weeks earlier. In the context of the Middle East, the symbolism of the badge refers

⁶⁵ Czech News Agency Council. *Usnesení Rady České tiskové kanceláře č. 15/2024 ze 197. zasedání konaného dne 9. 7. 2024*. Online. 2024. Available from: https://www.ctk.cz/o-ctk/rada_ctk/usneseni/?id=3836. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

to the lynching of two Israelis that occurred in Ramallah in 2000.⁶⁶ The badge sparked significant controversy during the Oscar ceremony, a controversy that many Czech media outlets also reported. It is therefore unlikely that the Czech artists were unaware of it.

The protest was linked to the promotion of the petition “Czech Artists for Ceasefire”⁶⁷ which appealed to the representatives of the Czech Republic to call for an immediate de-escalation and ceasefire in Gaza and Israel before thousands more people lose their lives. The petition’s text employs established narratives. It distorts facts: “1 million people are currently dying of famine”, terrorists imprisoned by Israel are referred to as “Palestinian hostages”, and there is no mention of the October 7th attack or of Hamas, which started the war. All responsibility is assigned to Israel, which, in pro-Palestinian propaganda, is never the victim, but always the perpetrator.

The most prominent figure of pro-Palestinian activism among artists became the singer Tomáš Klus. He was, after all, also the initiator of the mentioned petition. He entered the public debate, primarily fuelled by emotions. His first significant act was a song titled *Bezpečí doupěte* (The Safety of the Den), released by T. Klus on March 7th. The music video for the song about child victims in Gaza is preceded by the caption “Genocide

⁶⁶ Fiala, Luděk. *Celebrity na Andělech provokovaly s odznaky připomínajícími Izraelcům masakr v Ramalláhu*. Online. Novinky.cz. 31. 03. 2024. Available from: <https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/kultura-celebrity-na-andelech-provokovaly-s-odznacky-pripominajicimi-izraelcum-masakr-v-ramallahu-40466020>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

Tarant, Zbyněk. *Co sdělují Klusovy krvavé ruce? Ani zpěvák samotný si neuvědomuje mnohoznačný význam symbolu*. Online. Lidovky.cz. 27. 04. 2024. Available from: https://www.lidovky.cz/nazory/tomas-klus-zpevak-palestina-izrael.A240425_151009_ln_nazory_rkj. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁶⁷ Petition. *Czech Artist for Ceasefire*. Online. 2024. Available from: <https://humantohuman.cz/artistsforceasefire>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].



Banner at the Anděl Music Awards, March, Prague. Source: ČTK



The red palm symbol (left) refers to the lynching in Ramallah (right).
Source: Instagram, Profimedia.cz

begins with the silence of the world". In the second verse, an Israeli "dirty boot" tramples on dead Palestinian children.

A week later, T. Klus added a video to his social networks⁶⁸ full of absurd and false claims: the war in Gaza is, on Israel's part, an "arbitrary annexation and occupation"; it is alleged that the Palestinians have several times agreed to the possibility of a two-state solution, while Israel, on the contrary, "rejected a permanent ceasefire", etc. However, he made no mention of Hamas or the hostages. Immediately after its publication, the video became the target of ironic criticism,⁶⁹ to which Klus responded with an apology. In a post on his social networks, he stated that he did not condemn the Hamas attack because he considered it self-evident and explained that he wanted to draw attention to the "absence of expert discussion".⁷⁰

Not even a week later, T. Klus was a guest on Čestmír Strakatý's podcast.⁷¹ During the interview, he persisted with his historical, political, and geographical misconceptions, arguing that facts don't matter and that emotions are what's decisive. He repeated all the main theses of pro-Palestinian propaganda, including a cautious defence of Hamas and the accusation of Israel as the universal culprit. After several further media appearances,

⁶⁸ Tomáš Klus's Facebook profile. The video is available here: <https://www.facebook.com/TomasKlus/videos/1195060718143541/?t=0>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁶⁹ For a detailed analysis, see e.g., Fiala, Luděk. *Tomáš Klus zveřejnil video na podporu Gazy, je plně faulů*. Online. Novinky.cz. 15. 03. 2024. Available from: <https://www.novinky.cz/clanek/domaci-tomas-klus-zverejnil-video-na-podporu-gazy-je-plne-faulu-40464334>. [Accesses 2025-04-30].

⁷⁰ Šmejkal, Pavel. *Tomáš Klus natočil skandální video o dění v Gaze. Po vlně kritiky se snaží o „vysvětlení“*. Online. Forum 24. 18. 03. 2024. Available from: <https://www.forum24.cz/tomas-klus-natocil-skandalni-video-o-deni-v-gaze-po-vlne-kritiky-se-snazi-o-vysvetleni>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁷¹ Čestmír Strakatý's YouTube channel. *Tomáš Klus: V Gaze probíhá etnická čistka. Nemůžu mlčet*. Online. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E3C_FxA37ag. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

T. Klus faced Irena Kalhousová in the program *Epicentrum*.⁷² Their conversation was summed up by political geographer Michael Romancov in a brief tweet with these words: “Ugh... I assume that Mr. Klus is guided by the best motives, but this cannot excuse a fundamental ignorance of the relevant context or a failure to consider the causes and potential consequences of what he wants and what he thinks is right.”⁷³ Security analyst Milan Mikulecký assessed T. Klus’s actions less diplomatically. In response to the statement about a “lying idiot”, Klus filed a lawsuit against Mikulecký.⁷⁴ At the time this report was written, no final judgment had been issued.

The engagement of T. Klus is as dangerous as the activities of the proponents of academic antisemitism. T. Klus and IZKA may differ in their vocabulary and audience, but they have extraordinary influence and reach within their respective circles. Tomáš Klus, with a Palestinian flag and a keffiyeh around his neck, resolutely declares in front of the television camera that he is completely impartial. IZKA feigns impartiality in its texts and actions. Both Klus and IZKA ignore facts, deny reality, and paint a false picture of the world. Both Klus and IZKA utter the obligatory and hypocritical phrase condemning antisemitism while simultaneously spreading anti-Jewish hatred.

⁷² Horáková, Pavlína. *Expertka o Klusovi a jeho podpoře Palestiny: Vysekáváte si, co vám vyhovuje. Jak se zpěvák ohradil?* Online. Blesk.cz. 11. 04. 2024. Available from: <https://www.blesk.cz/clanek/zpravy-epicentrum/783396/expertka-o-klusovi-a-jeho-podpore-palestiny-vysekavate-si-co-vam-vyhovuje-jak-se-zpevak-ohradil.html>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁷³ Michael Romancov's X profile. The post is available here: <https://x.com/MichaelRoman-cov/status/1778118382673367392>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁷⁴ Potyšová, Kateřina. *Tomáš Klus se u soudu brání označení "prolhaný idiot". Považuje se za dojmologa*. Online. Zena.aktualne.cz. 14. 11. 2024. Available from: <https://zena.aktualne.cz/celebrity/tomas-klus-se-u-soudu-brani-oznaceni-prolhany-idiot-povazuje-se-za-dojmologa>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

12.8 | A BATTLE OF PETITIONS

On Tuesday, February 6, 2024, a petition titled “Call for a Change in the Czech Government’s Stance on the Middle East Crisis” was published. Nearly ninety initial signatories, mostly public figures, joined the eleven co-authors. The well-known names of academics, artists, and clergy lent the appeal urgency, respect, and credibility. The petition sparked a heated public debate, as its one-sided text does not mention the hostages, completely ignores the essence of the ongoing war, and blames only Israel for the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza. Shortly thereafter, three opposing petitions emerged: “Letter to the Czech Government: Support for Government Policy Towards Israel”, “We Support Israel in the Fight Against Terrorists, the Czech Government’s Stance is Correct”, and the so-called “Valentine’s Declaration”.⁷⁵ The signature battle continued throughout 2024, during which the rhetoric of the pro-Palestinian scene gradually intensified. Among other petitions published on the website [petice.com](https://www.petice.com), the following can be listed without claiming to be exhaustive:⁷⁶

- Call to the Government to Secure Urgent Humanitarian Aid for Gaza and Reach a Ceasefire Agreement (March 1, 2024)
- Petition Against the Student Exchange Program Between Charles University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (March 25, 2024)
- HUMANS FOR CEASEFIRE / We Demand a Ceasefire in Gaza and Israel (March 30, 2024)
- No to the Attack on Rafah. An Open Letter to the Czech Government, the President of the Czech Republic, and the Foreign Committees of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Czech Parliament (May 9, 2024)

⁷⁵ Duka, Dominik. *Valentýnská deklarace*. Online. iDNES.cz. 16. 02. 2024. Available from: <https://blog.idnes.cz/duka/valentynska-deklarace.Bg24020653>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

⁷⁶ All petitions are available here: <https://www.petice.com/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

- Statement of the FAMU Student Body on the Current Situation in Gaza and its Portrayal on Czech Television (June 17, 2024)
- Call to the Broad Academic Community in the Czech Republic to Express Solidarity with Palestinian Women and Men (June 18, 2024)
- I Call on the Czech Government to Support Diplomacy Instead of Escalation, Arming, and Destruction (June 23, 2024)
- Call on Prague Pride to Reject Apartheid (August 10, 2024)
- The World in Which We Cease to Strive for the Observance of International Law Will Become a World Ruled by the Arrogance of Power and Military Might (November 25, 2024)

Other anti-Israel-focused petitions, sometimes anonymous, were disseminated via social networks, email, and other websites. The names of the authors and main signatories were often repeated. The petition initiative became a permanent part of the pro-Palestinian scene's communication strategy.

12.9 | FROM THE STREETS TO THE STAGE

The pro-Palestinian scene systematically strengthened its presence and visibility in public spaces. Alongside marches and demonstrations in the centres of Czech cities, organisers focused their protests on specific buildings and institutions: embassies, universities, the government office, the seat of the European Commission's representation, Czech Television, local government offices, etc. Simultaneously, organisers sought to hold events in indoor venues. The prestige of the individual cooperating institutions contributed to the legitimisation of new antisemitism, which became part of the program in galleries, theatres, clubs, libraries, and cinemas. Consequently, protest gatherings took place both in front of universities and inside their lecture halls.



Public event “Against the Israeli genocide of Palestinians” at the Main Railway Station, April, Prague. Source: Facebook



The largest protest in front of Czech Television!
We reject one-sided information about events in Gaza and Israel
June 16, 2:00 PM, Czech Television, HQ



Pro-Palestinian demonstration in front of the Czech Television building, June, Prague. Source: social networks



Zdeněk Jehlička and Jana Ridvanová, along with several other activists, attempted to tear down Israeli flags from the building of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic and from the building of the Ministry of Finance. Police intervened against the unauthorised assembly. Furthermore, the activists had brought folding steps that were too short, so they could not reach the flags. January, Prague. Source: Facebook, PrahaIN.cz




The event "Justice for Palestine" at the Academy of Arts, Architecture and Design, during the opening of the school-wide exhibition. The organisers, among whom were students, graduates, and teachers, hung a seven-meter-long banner with the inscription "Justice for Palestine" in the main atrium and dropped hundreds of leaflets from the upper floors with slogans about Israel, which "caused a famine in Gaza", "is committing genocide", and "is deliberately destroying the Palestinian education system". June, Prague. Source: Instagram



"Israeli Academia and the Occupation. Facts vs. Myths. 1948, 1967, Gaza." A debate with anti-Israel activist and revisionist historian Ilan Pappé at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University, June, Prague. Source: Facebook

12.10 | THEFT OF ATTENTION

A characteristic feature of modern antisemitism is its ability to exploit any current context. The moment a specific topic loses its social relevance, it is replaced by another. The pro-Palestinian scene skilfully leveraged this phenomenon on social networks and in media appearances. It managed to misuse significant public events for its agenda: elections to the European Parliament, Senate elections, the Eurovision song contest, Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Summer Olympic Games, US presidential elections, personnel changes in the Czech government, significant anniversaries, etc. Pro-Palestinian activism uses the same marketing strategy to attract attention in public spaces. It operates parasitically, seeking to either disrupt or exploit other events for its own ends.




One out of 530 destroyed Palestinian villages.

On Saturday, June 15th, shortly after the anniversary of the Lidice massacre,⁷⁷ pro-Palestinian activists organised an event titled "Commemoration of the Lidice victims and remembrance of the 530 'Palestinian Lidices' destroyed so that the State of Israel could be established". June, Lidice. Source: Facebook

⁷⁷ Lidice, a small village in the Central Bohemia, was destroyed June 10, 1942. After the assassination on Reinhard Heydrich, May 27, 1942, the village was razed to the ground on the command of Karl Hermann Frank. 173 men were shot dead, women and most of the children were transported to concentration camps. See: <https://www.lidice-memorial.cz/en/>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].



Several pro-Palestinian activists disrupted the Prague book signing event for Prime Minister Petr Fiala's new book. Due to the continuous shouting, the Prime Minister had to abandon his introductory speech. The protesters chanted slogans such as "Free Palestine" and "From the River to the Sea, Palestine Will Be Free", accused the Prime Minister of having "Palestinian blood on his hands" and "doing the Nazi salute for Israel", and loudly argued with other participants of the book signing. The planned program fell apart because of the demonstrators. May, Prague. Source: iDNES.cz



A group of pro-Palestinian activists disrupted a session of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. With long speeches about "Czech support for genocide" they made the proceedings impossible and had to be escorted out of the room. November, Prague. Source: social networks



On the first Saturday in April, the annual National March for Life took place in Prague, a controversial protest gathering whose organisers seek a ban on abortions. Several hundred opponents from left-wing, feminist, and queer initiatives attempted to block the procession.⁷⁸ Among the opponents was a group of pro-Palestinian activists with banners reading “The best thing is simply to help Palestinian civilians”, “We don’t judge, we help unexpectedly bombed women”, and “March for Life in Palestine”. April, Prague. Source: DenikAlarm.cz



⁷⁸ ČTK. *Pochod pro život skončil na Václavském náměstí, most Legií zablokovali odpůrci*. Online. České noviny. 06. 04. 2024. Available from: <https://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/2501876>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].



Slogans "No Pride in Genocide", "Queer Intifada", and "Stop Israel from Killing Palestinian Queers", August, Prague. Source: Facebook

On the second Saturday in August, the LGBT+ parade Prague Pride took place. The group Queers for Palestine convened the so-called Palestinian Block, about which the invitation stated: "The anti-Pinkwashing, anti-genocide, anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist, and anti-fascist block is an informal alliance of local pro-Palestinian, intersectional, non-commercial, and alternative queer collectives that consider Pride to be a protest." The organisers of Prague Pride stated in a public announcement that the Palestinian Block was not an official part of the event, but they would not prevent it from taking place. Several dozen activists participated in the Palestinian Block, carrying flags and banners and chanting slogans such as "Queer intifada now, take your hands off Palestine" or "There is only one solution: intifada, revolution".

The Palestinian Block became the subject of massive criticism. The Prague City Council, which financially supports Prague Pride, adopted a resolution at its September 12th meeting supporting Israel and changing the grant rules for event organisers.⁷⁹ The resolution, among other

⁷⁹ Capital City of Prague. *Usnesení Zastupitelstva hlavního města Prahy číslo 16/12 ze dne 12. 9. 2024*. Online. 2024. Available from: <https://zastupitelstvo.praha.eu/ina/tedusndetail.aspx?par=169207010018013230220207028018013230217207025018013230218207022018013230218207018013230223226218218222225>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

things, declares that it fully recognises the existence of the State of Israel and condemns any attempts to question it, and expresses fundamental disagreement with the fact that the organisers of Prague Pride 2024 did not intervene during the event against the active participation of pro-Palestinian/anti-Israel activists.



"Human rights apply to Palestinians too! For your freedom and ours!"

On the anniversary of November 17, 1939, and 1989, when public events were held in many places across the Czech Republic, pro-Palestinian activists organised a gathering and march in Prague titled "For Your Freedom and Ours". November 17th is the Day of the Struggle for Freedom and Democracy and International Students' Day. The organisers explained the misuse of the state holiday in the invitation as follows: "We do not want to commemorate the holiday of the struggle for freedom only by laying wreaths at monuments to past battles, while our political representation supports the Israeli occupation and its war crimes. We do not want just to watch those who will preach to us collectively about freedom, while they destroy the freedom of Palestinians by supporting Israeli apartheid." November, Prague. Source: Facebook

12.11 | THE DENIAL OF ANTISEMITISM

“Anti-Israel individuals (...) often take care to assure the reader or listener that they are definitely not antisemites – it’s a kind of variation of the well-known introductory phrase ‘I’m not a racist, but...’. They protest against accusations of antisemitism by pointing to their Jewish friends or a distant ancestor, and their general, well-known stance against violence and hate. But these are all secondary matters: for identifying an antisemite, their heritage is not decisive (why should it be?), nor is it essential to what extent they are aware of their antisemitism and its consequences. An antisemite is not defined by declaring their impartiality and noble intentions – they are defined by what they say and spread about their target.”⁸⁰

A declarative condemnation of antisemitism is a mandatory feature of all the anti-Israel activists discussed in the previous chapters. It is fair to say that some of them seem to be completely unaware of their own prejudiced thinking. The others expend great effort to defend themselves.

The easiest path is the simple rejection of the IHRA definition of antisemitism, or rather, all of its parts that relate to Israel. This strategy allows them to relativise and trivialise expressions of hatred.

The second possibility for self-defence is attack, the most common form of which is their accusation that antisemitism is being exploited for alleged political goals. Their fundamental argument refers to the principle explicitly stated in the IHRA definition: that criticism of Israel cannot be equated

⁸⁰ Drda, Adam. *Kdo je antisemita?* Online. Bubínek Revolveru. 26. 03. 2024. Available from: <https://www.bubinekrevolveru.cz/kdo-je-antisemita>. [Accessed 2025-04-30].

with antisemitism. Through this argumentative fallacy, anti-Israel activists declare their hateful lies and manipulations to be legitimate criticism.

Both strategies usually overlap, as is evident, for example, from the reactions to the 2023 Annual Report on Antisemitism:

SOCIAL
MEDIA

“The annual spread of antisemitism by the Federation of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic. This time, too, their activists rushed in with a hodgepodge of a so-called annual report that confuses actual antisemitism with the fabricated kind, which is purposefully manufactured to defend Israel (...).”

August, Facebook

ONLINE
ARTICLE

“As long as criticism of Israel is also considered antisemitism, it will not be possible to monitor its real development and manifestations, and thus to think through functional strategies on how to fight it. If we downplay it and confuse it with political criticism of an entire state, we will paradoxically harm the people who are genuinely affected by real antisemitism, namely Jewish women and men.”

August, DenikAlarm.cz

The seemingly sophisticated and cultivated language of new antisemitism is the antithesis of traditional vulgar anti-Jewish hatred. However, the content is the same.

SOCIAL
MEDIA

“It is somewhat necessary to put pressure on that stinking Jewish riffraff.”

“So let them leave (...). In the Middle Ages, they were barely allowed anywhere, and I believe there are good reasons for that.”

“No sane person cares about antisemitism these days anyway. Only Zionist bastards do; they made business out of it.”

August, social network X

13 | LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Academics Against Apartheid
ADL	Anti-Defamation League
AR	Annual Report on Antisemitism in the Czech Republic
BDS	Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions
BIS	Security Information Service / Bezpečnostní informační služba České republiky
ČTK	Czech News Agency / Česká tisková kancelář
CVVM	Public Opinion Research Centre / Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění
FAMU	Film and TV School of the Academy of Performing Arts in Prague / Filmová a televizní fakulta Akademie múzických umění
FJC	Federation of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic
FRA	European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
FRE	Far-Right Extremism
IHRA	International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance
ISM	International Solidarity Movement
IZKA	Initiative for Critical Academia / Iniciativa za kritickou akademii
JCP	Jewish Community of Prague / Židovská obec v Praze

MEMRI	Middle East Media Research Institute
NCTEKK	National Counterterrorism, Extremism and Cybercrime Agency / Národní centrála proti terorismu, extremismu a kybernetické kriminalitě
STEM	Centre for Empirical Research
TSC	Tactical and Statistical Classification / Takticko-statistická klasifikace

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www.fzo.cz

<https://www.facebook.com/Federacezidovskychobci/>

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